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Abstract 
In the United States and Europe the constitutionality of government displays of confessional symbols 
depends on whether the symbols also have nonconfessional secular meaning or whether, at least, the 
confessional meaning is somehow absent. Yet both the United States Supreme Court (USSCt) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) lack a workable approach to determining whether secular 
meaning is present or confessional meaning absent. 
The problem is that the government can nearly always articulate a possible secular meaning for the 
confessional symbols that it uses, or argue that the confessional meaning is conceivably absent. What 
matters, however, is not the possibility that secular meaning is present or confessional meaning absent, 
but whether whether this presence or absence is historically and culturally authentic. Courts largely 
ignore this, routinely appealing to history and culture to justify government use of confessional 
symbols without undertaking a serious investigation of either one. 
Drawing on the work of C.S. Peirce, we propose that courts ask three successive questions in religious 
symbol cases: 
1) Is the ordinary meaning of the symbol confessional or otherwise religious? 
2) Does the immediate context in which the symbol is displayed suggest a possible historical, 
cultural, or other secular meaning? 
3) Is this alternate secular meaning authentically present and genuinely recognized in the history 
and culture of the place where the symbol is displayed? 
We illustrate this approach with Salazar v. Buono, in which the USSCt upheld government display of 
a Christian cross, and Lautsi & Others v. Italy, in which the ECtHR deferred to Italian court decisions 
upholding government display of a Catholic crucifix. While the USSCt in Buono and the Italian courts 
in Lautsi imagine conceivable nonconfessional meanings for the confessional symbol at issue, neither 
meaning can be found in American or Italian history or culture. In Lautsi, therefore, the ECtHR ends 
up deferring to a nonexistent Italian “tradition.” 
Judical denial of obvious confessional meaning and invention of substitute secular meanings for 
confessional symbols betrays a cultural schizophrenia: Majoritarian religions rail against the 
secularization of culture and its subversion of belief, yet they insist that their confessional symbols 
remain at home in this culture. But confessional symbols no longer fit in mainstream culture as 
confessional—hence their redefinition as secular, even and especially by the majoritarian religions that 
use them. Ironically, judicial secularization of these symbols to validate their use by government is 
likely to accelerate and entrench the very secularization that such religions deplore. 
This Essay includes as appendices English translations of the two Italian administrative court 
decisions, which had not previously been translated from the original Italian. 
Keywords 
Acculturation, Buono, cross, crucifix, culture, Establishment Clause, European Court of Human 
Rights, inculturation, interpretation, Italy, laicità, Lautsi, semiotics, meaning, religious neutrality, 
religious symbols, Salazar, secularism 
 1 
Introduction: Dimensions of Religious Symbolic Meaning 
Under the constitutional norms of both the United States and Europe the critical inquiry when 
government displays a religious symbol is what the symbol means. Symbolic meaning that coerces or 
endorses religion violates the U.S. Establishment Clause,
1
 while meaning that threatens religious 
pluralism or minority religious liberty violates the European Convention on Human Rights (the 
“Convention”).2 
In the United States and Europe, the legality of government display of a religious symbol depends 
on whether the symbol possesses nonconfessional significance or, at least, lacks meaningful 
confessional significance. Yet both the United States Supreme Court (USSCt) and the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) lack a workable approach to the crucial determination whether the required 
secular meaning is actually present or the prohibited confessional meaning really absent. 
Two recent religious symbol cases illustrate the doctrinal the problem. In Salazar v. Buono,
3
 a 
plurality of the USSCt rested its decision on the purportedly secular meaning of a large white Latin 
cross at a World War I veterans memorial located in the midst of a vast tract of federal park land. The 
plurality denied that the cross symbolized only Christianity and the Christian resurrection, insisting 
that it additionally memorialized the sacrifices of U.S. military veterans.
4
 
                                                     
1
 U.S. CONST., amend. I, cl. 1 (“Congress shall pass no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .); e.g., McCreary 
City. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (display of Ten Commandment in county courthouse motivated by government 
desire to endorse Christianity); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (government-sponsored graduation prayer 
psychologically coerced students and their families) to participate in a religious ceremony; City & Cty. of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (display of Christmas nativity in county courthouse constituted endorsement of 
Christianity); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (display of Ten Commandments in public school might coerce 
Christian belief in impressionable schoolchildren). 
2
 See EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS art. 9 (Coun. Eur. – Rome Nov. 4, 1950), 
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#P1. 
 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
 2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 Id.; id., prot. no. 1, art. 2 (Coun. Eur. - Paris March 20, 1952). 
 No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to 
education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity 
with their own religions and philosophical convictions. 
 Id.; see Claudia E. Haupt, Transnational Nonestablishment, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 991 (2012) (arguing that the ECtHR 
and other sources of EU law have combined to create an emerging European principle of nonestablishment); Susanna 
Mancini, Taking Secularism (not too) seriously: the Italian “crucifix case”, I RELIG. & HUM. RTS. 179, 180 (2006) 
(arguing that “a secular state is the pre-condition for any functional religious accommodation and for the protection of 
minority religions and convictions.”). 
3
 Buono v. Norton, 212 F.Supp.2d 202 (C.D.Cal. 2002), aff’d, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004), on motion to enforce judg., 364 
F.Supp.2d 1175 (C.D.Cal. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir.), amended & superseded 
on denial of reh. en banc, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S.Ct. 1803 
(2010). 
4
 130 S.Ct. at 1820 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., & in pertinent part by Alito, J.); see also 
Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 765 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of reh. en banc) 
(“While the cross at Sunrise Rock takes the form of an ordinarily religious symbol, it serves the secular purpose of 
memorializing fallen soldiers. [T]he lack of any challenge to the Sunrise Rock memorial for seven decades surely 
demonstrates that the public understands and accepts its secular commemorative purpose.”) (emphasis in original). 
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In Lautsi and Others v. Italy,
 5
 Italian courts found that crucifixes posted in public school 
classrooms signified the Christian roots of human rights and liberal democracy rather than merely 
Roman Catholicism; a Grand Chamber of the ECtHR then held under the margin-of-appreciation 
doctrine that this practice did not violate the Convention or threaten related principles of religious 
pluralism or minority religious liberty because the crucifix is a mere passive symbol that exerts no 
effect on non-Catholic students in the absence of other evidence of religious coercion.
6
 
The plurality opinion in Buono and the opinions of the Italian courts in Lautsi depend on whether 
the confessional symbol in each case actually had the nonconfessional meaning and effect asserted for 
it, while the Grand Chamber’s opinion depends on the absence of any religious symbolic meaning at 
all. No court, however, made a persuasive case for the presence or absence of the meaning and effect 
on which everything seemed to depend.
7
 The Buono plurality's contention that the veterans memorial 
cross signified also secular honor of military sacrifice is the classic ipse dixit.
8
 The Italian courts did 
little better, baldly asserting a secular cultural-historical that supposedly crowded out the ordinary 
Roman Catholic meaning of the classroom crucifix. The ECtHR, meanwhile, simply proclaimed that a 
classroom crucifix projects no confessional influence at all despite its status as the quintessential 
symbol of Italy’s majority Catholic faith.9 Lacking in the USSCt and the Italian court cases was any 
serious investigation of whether the supposedly “historical-cultural” meaning and effect attributed to 
cross and crucifix are real or imagined—that is, present and recognizable in American and Italian 
history and culture, or simply made-up to justify government use of the symbols. In both cases the 
courts appeal to history and culture, yet their historical and cultural findings are mere assertions or 
speculations, as if “history” and “culture” may simply be invented in chambers. 
                                                     
5
 Sentenza N. 56/04, Ric. No. 2007/02 (Trib. Ammin. Reg. Veneto – Sez. I Nov. 13, 2003), referral remanded for lack of 
juris., Ordinanza N. 389 (Corte Cost. Dec. 13, 2004), on remand, Sentenza N. 1110/2005, Ric. N. 2007./02 (Trib. 
Ammin. Reg. Veneto – Sez. III Mar. 17, 2005), aff’d, Decisione N. 556/06, N. 7314/2005 Reg. Dec. (Cons. Stato Jan. 13, 
2006), rev’d in part sub nom. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06 (E.Ct.H.R. – 2nd Sect. Nov. 3, 2009) (7-0 dec.) 
[hereinafter Lautsi], rev’d sub. nom. Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06 (E.Ct.H.R. – Grand Chamber Mar. 18, 
2011) (15-2 dec.) [hereinafter Lautsi & Others]. 
6
 Lautsi & Others, at 29 ¶¶ 70, 72 (internal cross-reference deleted). 
 The “margin of appreciation” doctrine permits the ECtHR “to assume, on certain issues, an attitude of deference with 
respect to decisions of [contracting] States that apparently impact rights guaranteed” by the Convention. Pasquale 
Annicchino, Tra Margine di Apprezzamento e Neutralità: Il Caso «Lautsi» e I Nuovi Equilibri della Tutela Europea 
della Libertà Religiosa, in DIRITTO E RELIGIONE IN EUROPA 179, 181 (Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino, Roberto Mazzola ed. 
2012) (authors’ translation). The ECtHR generally uses the doctrine to avoid making a definitive rule with respect to 
questions that are particularly complicated or controversial or as to which the contracting states have not reached 
consensus. Id. at 182. For a general introduction, see G. LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 In applying the margin-of-appreciation doctrine, the ECtHR accepted Italy’s self-serving representation that its public 
schools are models of religious pluralism, neutrality, and minority liberty. Lautsi & Others, at 30 ¶ 74 (internal citation 
omitted). Commentators from Italy and elsewhere have criticized this credulous account of the treatment of religious 
minorities (and especially Muslims) in Italian public schools. See, e.g. Allison Mawhinney, Crucifixes, Classrooms and 
Children: A Semiotic Cocktail, in THE LAUTSI PAPERS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY REFLECTIONS ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE 
PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSROOM 93, 109-10 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) [hereinafter THE LAUTSI 
PAPERS]. 
7
 It is sometimes argued argued that the purely religious or confessional meaning or effect of a symbol need not invalidate 
its use by government. See, e.g., McCreary Cty v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005). (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
Establishment Clause permits government endorsement of monotheism and disregard of polytheists and unbelievers); cf. 
ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2013); (same with respect to “religion in general” when articulated at a “high level of abstraction”). Because we take as a 
premise that the U.S. and European law requires that religious symbols be understood either to have nonconfessional 
meaning and effect, or at least to lack confessional meaning and effect, when displayed by government, see supra notes 
1-8 & accompanying text, we do not address these arguments. 
8
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“something asserted but not proved”). 
9
 Lautsi & Others, at 29 ¶ 72. 
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Academic literature reflects the same problem. Commentary on government use of religious 
symbols is legion,
10
 much of it prompted by Buono and Lautsi themselves.
11
 Like the USSCt and 
Italian courts, however, commentators make assertions about historical-cultural meanings without 
seriously investigating either history or culture.
12
 The doctrinal results are predictable: Thinly sourced 
                                                     
10
 See, e.g., 2 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Establishment and Fairness 69-86 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2008); Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Rhetoric of Church and State 65-80 (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1995); Koppelman, supra note 7, at 73-76; Lorie G. Beaman, Battles over Symbols: The “Religion” of 
the Minority versus the “Culture” of the Majority, 28 J.L. & Relig. 67 (2013); Gerard V. Bradley, The Wren Cross 
Controversy: Religion and the Public University, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2217 (2008); Caroline Corbin, Nonbelievers 
and Government Speech, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 347 (2012); B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A 
Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 491 (2005) [hereinafter Hill, Religious 
Symbolism]; RonNell Andersen Jones, Pick Your Poison: Private Speech, Government Speech, and the Special Problem 
of Religious Displays, 2010 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 2045 (2010); Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: 
Transparent Rationalizations and Expedient Post-Modernism, 61 Case Wes. Res. L. Rev. 1211 (2011); William P. 
Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”: The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 495 (1986); Frank S. 
Ravitch, Religious Objects As Legal Subjects, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1011 (2005); Joshua D. Zarrow, Note, Of Crosses 
and Creches: The Establishment Clause and Publicly Sponsored Displays of Religious Symbols, 35 Am. U. L. Rev. 
477(1986). See also Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First Amendment 
Ethnography, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2261 (2004). 
11
 See, e.g., CARLO CARDIA, IDENTITÀ RELIGIOSA E CULTURALE EUROPEA: LA QUESTIONE DEL CROCIFISSO (Turin: Umberto 
Allemandi, 2010); KOPPELMAN, supra note 7, at 75-76; Ian Bartrum, Salazar v. Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the 
Secular State, 104 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1653 (2010); Giuseppe Casuscelli, Il crocifisso nelle sculole: neutralità dello Stato e 
«regola della precauzione», OLIR: OSSERVATORIO DELLE LIBERTÀ ED ISTITUZIONI RELIGIOSE (July 2005), www.olir.it; Jlia 
Pasquali Cerioli, Laicità dello stato ed esposizione del crocifisso: brevi note sul (diffcile) rapport tra la presenza del 
simbolo religioso nelle strutture publicche e il principio di separazione degli ordini, OLIR: OSSERVATORIO DELLE 
LIBERTÀ ED ISTITUZIONI RELIGIOSE (July 2005), www.olir.it; Adam Linkner, How Salazar v. Buono Synthesizes the 
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause Precedent into a Single Test, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 57 (2011); Christopher C. 
Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 1387 (2011); Mancini, supra 
note 2; Andrea Pin, Public Schools, the Italian Crucifix, and the European Court of Human Rights: The Italian 
Separation of Church and State, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 95 (2011); Mary Elizabeth Roper, Note, Secular Crosses and 
the Neutrality of Secularism: Reflections on the Demands of Neutrality and its Consequences for Religious Symbols—the 
European Court of Human Rights in Lautsi and the U.S. Supreme Court in Salazar, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 841 
(2012); Vincenzo Turchi, La pronuncia della Grande Chambre della Corte di Strasburgo sul caso Lautsi C. Italia: post 
nubile Phoebus, STATO, CHIESE E PLURALISMO CONFESSIONALE (Oct. 2011), www.statoeheise.it; J.H.H. Weiler, Freedom 
of Religion and Freedom from Religion: The European Model, 65 MAINE L. REV. 759 (2013); John Witte, Jr. & Nina-
Louisa Arnold, Lift High the Cross: Contrasting the New European and American Cases on Religious Symbols on 
Government Property, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 5 (2011). 
 Two important collections of commentary on Lautsi are THE LAUTSI PAPERS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY REFLECTIONS ON 
RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSROOM 35 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, Joren 
Tempermann ed. 2012), and Symposium, State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the U.S. and Europe, 51 J. CATH. LEGAL 
STUDIES (forthcoming 2013). 
12
 See, e.g, CARDIA, supra note 11, at 112-22 (characterizing classroom display of crucifix as secular signifier of roots of 
Italian culture based on quotations from selected Italian liberals); Bartrum, supra note 11, at 1661-64 (speculating that 
Buono plurality might have properly concluded that cross had lost confessional meaning through display at military 
monuments and cemeteries); Beaman, supra note 10 (assuming nonexistence of “culture” used to justify government 
display of majoritarian symbols); Bradley, supra note 10, at 2262 (suggesting without demonstrating that cross possesses 
“some meaning for everyone as an example or illustration of certain universal values,” like “love,” “sacrifice,” and 
perhaps “redemption”); Allison Mawhinney, Crucifixes, Classrooms, and Children: A Semiotic Cocktail, in THE LAUTSI 
PAPERS, supra note 6, at 93 (asserting that Italy’s invocation of “historical-cultural” meaning for crucifix cynically 
deployed Catholicism to define Italian identity); J.H.H. Weiler, Freedom of Religion and Freedom from Religion: The 
European Model, 65 MAINE L. REV. 759 (2013) (asserting that crosses and crucifixes are symbols of national identity); 
Witte & Arnold, supra note 11, at 30, 52-53 (reading cases as permitting government display of confessional symbols 
because they have historical and cultural meaning, despite failure of cases to investigate history or culture); see also 
Lautsi & Others, at 38-43 (Bonello, J., concurring) (asserting that crucifix is customary secular symbol of Italian 
“cultural personality”). 
 Among the few exceptions are C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Cross at College: Accommodation of Religion at Public 
Universities, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 939 (2008) (detailing history of Wren cross displayed within chapel at state-
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4 
and ultimately unpersuasive judgments about purportedly present nonconfessional meanings (or 
supposedly absent confessional ones) that underwrite the validity of government displays of 
confessional symbols. 
We propose that when the meaning of a confessional religious symbol is at constitutional issue, 
courts should ask three successive questions: 
1) Is the ordinary meaning of the symbol confessional or otherwise religious?13 
2) If so, does the immediate context in which the symbol is displayed suggest an alternate secular 
meaning for the confessional symbol?
14
 
3) If so, is this alternate secular meaning authentically present and genuinely recognized in the 
history and culture in which the confessional symbol is displayed?
15
 
Buono and Lautsi exemplify the problems that arise from failure to fully explore these dimensions of 
religious symbolic meaning,
16
 and illustrate deeper trends of secularization and acculturation 
highlighted by the historical-cultural dimension.
17
 We close with the suggestion that attempts by 
traditionally dominant religions to defend government use of their confessional symbols by 
manufacturing “secular” meanings for them or denying their obvious confessional ones only 
undermines authentic religious belief and hastens the social irrelevance of such religions.
18
  
I. Three Modes of Symbolic Meaning 
American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce provided a useful vocabulary for the dimensions of 
symbolic meaning. Peirce maintained that a sign “conveys to the mind an idea about a thing,”19 in 
three ways. Likenesses or “icons” imitate the things they represent, like a photograph, an architectural 
plan, or certain Egyptian hieroglyphics.
20
 “Indications” or “indices” are linked to some thing or effect 
in the world, like a street sign to the street it marks, smoke with fire, or a greeting with the person to 
whom it is directed.
21
 Finally, “general signs,” “tokens,” or “symbols”—Peirce used all three terms 
interchangeably—possess a significance acquired by custom, usage, or convention, like a police 
(Contd.)                                                                  
owned College of William & Mary as basis for conclusion that display violated Establishment Clause); B. Jessie Hill, Of 
Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and Change in Meaning over Time, DUKE L.J. (2009) 
[hereinafter Hill, Ceremonial Deism] (arguing that before a facially religious text may be constitutionally used by 
government, it should be proved to have lost its confessional force by a specific demonstration of history). 
 Finally, a few commentators have suggested the relevance of historical or cultural analysis without specifying its 
analytical significance. See, e.g. Linkner, supra note 11, at 75-78 (suggesting history as a supplement to the endorsement 
test); Mark L. Movesesian, Crosses and Culture: State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the US and Europe, 1 OXFORD 
J.L. & RELIG. 338 (2012) (arguing that differing U.S. and European doctrines for confessional symbols reflect different 
cultural conceptions about the social purpose of religion). 
13
 See infra Part I-A. 
14
 See infra Part I-B. 
15
 See infra Part I-C. 
16
 See infra Part II. 
17
 See infra Part III. 
18
 See infra Conclusion. 
19
 2 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS (1893-1915) 5 (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, Nathan Houser, et.al. ed. 1998); accord 1 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE: 
SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS (1867-1893) 225 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, Nathan Houser, et.al. ed. 
1992) (“A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind.). 
20
 2 PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 5-6, 7; accord 1 PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 226 (“Icons are so completely substituted for their 
objects as hardly to be distinguished from them.”); 2 id. at 307 (“An icon . . . possesses the quality signified.”). 
21
 2 PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 5. 
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officer’s badge (signifying civil authority), a theatre ticket (signifying right of entrance), or a warning 
bell or buzzer (signifying danger).
22
 
Most signs combine iconic, indicational, and conventional meaning.
23
 For example, the traditional 
Christmas nativity or crêch iconically replicates the New Testament accounts of Jesus’s birth, it is 
indexed to an event that Christians believe took place in literal history,
 24
 and it is conventionally 
associated in the West with the Christmas holiday celebrating the birth of the Christian Messiah and 
the related hope in salvation through him.
25
 
Peirce’s semiotics of icon, index, and token suggest three inquiries necessary to ascertain the 
constitutionally relevant meaning of confessional symbols displayed by government: the sign’s 
ordinary confessional meaning, based on its similarity to the idea or thing it signifies; the sign’s 
alternate meaning, based on whether the specific context in which the sign is displayed might 
conceivably displace its confessional meaning with a secular alternative; and the alternate meaning’s 
historical-cultural fit, based whether it is authentically present and genuinely recognized in the history 
and culture of the place where it is displayed. 
A. Ordinary Confessional Meaning 
“Ordinary meaning,” as we employ it, is rooted in the notion of “literal,” “semantic,” or “linguistic” 
meaning—that is, the meaning of a text based on the rules of the language in which it is written.26 
Consider the sentence, “This chair is broken.” By the rules of English spelling and grammar, the 
combination of letters and words signifies (i) an object on which people sit, generally having a seat, a 
back, and four legs, that is (ii) deficient—missing a leg, or otherwise unstable, or having a seat worn 
through or a missing back. This is the literal, semantic, or linguistic meaning of the sentence. 
The “ordinary” meaning of a symbol is analogous to semantic meaning, constituting the object or 
idea that the symbol superficially signifies according to the communicative rules of the culture in 
which it is displayed, without attending to contextual details or deploying a very thick cultural 
knowledge. To return to the Christian nativity, in the West it ordinarily signifies the birth of the son of 
God to save the world from death and sin. Strictly speaking, this meaning exceeds the purely semantic 
or iconic: It literally depicts a group of adults in ancient garb kneeling before a baby and a couple who 
appear to be its parents, in a stable filled with hay and barnyard animals. One needs a cursory 
                                                     
22
 2 PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 5; accord 1 PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 225-26 (A token “is related to its object only in 
consequence of a mental association, and depends upon a habit. Such signs . . . are, for the most part, conventional or 
arbitrary.”); 2 PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 9 (A symbol is “a conventional sign, or one depending upon habit . . . .”). 
23
 See 2 PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 10. 
24
 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 10, at 1213. 
 The nativity scene . . . necessarily depicts the first of the two miracles at the heart of Christianity. The nativity scene 
depicts the incarnation of God in human form--or as much Christian literature refers to it, the Incarnation with a capital I. 
[W]ithout the Incarnation, the nativity scene becomes either a meaningless arrangement of figures engaged in some 
unidentifiable activity (which no one believes), or it becomes a depiction of false worship--a depiction that would horrify 
its sponsors. If you think about it even a little bit seriously, the nativity scene can only represent the Christian belief in the 
Incarnation. 
 Id.; see also id. at 1214 (“[I]t seems rather odd to describe a miraculous event as merely historical. But of course 
Christians who fully believe in the miracle believe that it actually happened and that it happened in historic time. So from 
a Christian perspective, the event is historical as well as miraculous.”). 
 Id. 
25
 See, e.g., Laycock, Religious Displays, supra note 10, at 1212-14.  
26
 See JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM 110-11 (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1982). 
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knowledge of Western culture—an awareness of the Gospel accounts of Jesus’s birth—to understand 
it as a common representation of that birth. 
Similarly, a Latin cross merely imitates the most common form of execution among the ancient 
Romans, and crucifixes only depict a man nailed to such a cross. For anyone with a faint acquaintance 
with Western culture, however, these signs are instantly recognizable as symbols of Christianity—the 
Roman cross on which Jesus was crucified—and Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy—Jesus nailed 
and dying on that very cross. We refer to these as the “ordinary” meanings of the cross and crucifix.27 
Nonlinguistic confessional symbols are the quintessential Peircean icon.
28
 Every religious sign 
displayed by the government has an ordinary confessional meaning—a predominant iconic meaning 
rooted in its similarity to a religious belief that has cultural salience.  
B. Alternate Secular Meaning 
Peirce maintained that a correlative relationship exists between the indicational meaning of a sign and 
its object in the world.
29
 Certainly the physical context in which a confessional sign is displayed will 
affect the meaning of the sign, sometimes to the point of apparently displacing its ordinary 
confessional meaning with another, secular meaning.  
Consider, again, “This chair is broken.”30 It could constitute a warning, if directed at someone 
about to sit on it: “This chair is broken,” don’t sit on it! But at a garage sale it could instead be an 
explanation: “This chair is broken,” I don’t want to buy it. Or an accusation, from someone who has 
fallen from it: “This chair is broken,” you should have told me! Although the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence remains the same in each example, its meaning changes according to the context in which it 
uttered.
31
 As these examples illustrate, the meaning of a sign depends on the context in which the 
semantic meaning of the sign is deployed.
32
 
The meaning of confessional signs likewise depends on the physical context in which they are 
displayed. Given the ordinary meaning of the Christian nativity as a sign of Jesus’s miraculous birth, 
its placement on the lawn of a Protestant church identifies a place of Christian worship. But a nativity 
                                                     
27
 See infra Parts II-A-1 & II-B-1. 
28
 See “Signs and Symbols,” in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 437, 441 (New York: MacMillan & Free Press, Paul 
Edwards ed. 1967). 
29
 See supra notes 19-23 & accompanying text. 
30
 The following are examples of “performative” meaning drawn from CULLER, supra note 26, at 113. See also infra note 
31. 
31
 See ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY 42 (New York: Hill and Wang & Noonday, Annette Lavers & Colin 
Smith trans. 1967) (“T]he union of signifier and signified . . . does not exhaust the semantic act, for the sign derives its 
value also from its surroundings.”). 
 The relationship between an indicational sign and its object approximates the “performative effect” of spoken language. 
See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2nd ed. 1975). Most 
utterances do not passively reflect or describe the world, but also actively “do” something in it. See Austin, supra note 
31, at 94. For example, when uttered by a cleric of government official, “I now pronounce you husband and wife” effects 
legally binding marriage AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 5.  
 Although Austin restricted his analysis of performatives to the spoken word, others have applied it to signs. See, e.g., 
STÈPHANE BEAULAC, THE POWER OF LANGUAGE IN THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 
2004); NELSON GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF ART: AN APPROACH TO A THEORY OF SYMBOLS (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1968); Hill, Religious Symbolism, supra note 10, at 545. 
32
 Hill, Ceremonial Deism, supra note 12, at 36; e.g, Brett Scharffs, The Role of Judges in Determining the Meaning of 
Religious Symbols, in THE LAUTSI PAPERS, supra note 11, at 35, 41(Flag-burning means something different when 
conducted by “Palestinian protesters in the West Bank” or “a large crowd on the Mall” than by “American Legionnaires 
or the Boy Scouts.”). 
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displayed by itself in the lobby of a courthouse might additionally imply Christian bias in the 
administration of justice.
33
 And yet, the identical nativity in a commercial shopping district surrounded 
by secular signs and symbols may find its ordinary Christian significance diluted or entirely absent, 
displaced by another, secular meaning according to which the nativity is simply a marker of the 
“winter holiday season” celebrated by Christians, some nonChristians, and most unbelievers.34 
The significance of a religious sign displayed by the government is not necessarily its ordinary 
confessional meaning. That meaning is shaped, diluted, and sometimes wholly displaced by the 
physical context in which the sign is displayed. 
C. Historical-Cultural Presence 
Signs have no “inherent” meaning—that is, there is no natural or necessary relationship between a sign 
and the idea or object it signifies. As Ferdinand de Saussure put it, the “bond between the signifier and 
the signified is arbitrary.”35 “Arbitrary,” however, does not mean “random” or “unconstrained,” as if 
one might attribute any meaning whatever to a sign; to the contrary, the only way that language and 
other signs can function is through conventional rules governing meaning.
36
 “Arbitrary” intends, 
rather, that the meaning of a sign is not rooted in the sign’s physical characteristics or otherwise latent 
within it, but is rather a function of its relations with other signs in the cultures that use them.
37
 
“Culture” consists of the “symbolic systems, imaginative representations and institutions specific 
to a society” that legitimate its “political and social order.”38 The signs and symbols that constitute a 
culture are generally used in regular and conventional ways.
39
 Roland Barthes metaphorically 
described this regularity as “contractual,”40 like the pseudo-historical “social contract.”41 Of course, 
the cultural contribution to a sign’s meaning is a legacy that precedes any particular use of the sign; 
the relation of sign and signifier is thus arbitrary in principle (ex ante) but not in practice (ex post).
42
 
Religion is freighted with culture—and vice versa. Each has grown out of and informed the other. 
Religion, in other words, is “inculturated”—accessed by and through the history and culture of its 
adherents, at the same time that it is “of” that history and culture, “an integral part” of it.43 Being 
                                                     
33
 See, e.g. City & Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
34
 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 68 (1984). This holding of Lynch has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Norman 
Dorsen & Charles Sims, The Nativity Scene Case: An Error of Judgment, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 837, 857; Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, Lynch and the Lunacy of Secularized Religion, 12 NEV. L.J. 640, 642-43 (2012); Laycock, supra note 10, at 
1213-14. 
35
 FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 67 (London: Peter Owen, Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye 
rev. ed. Wade Baskin trans. 1974). 
36
 CULLER, supra note 26, at 114-15; TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY 97 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1983); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 31 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986) (“We follow 
shared rules, they say, in using any word: these rules set out criteria that supply the word’s meaning.). 
37
 See EAGLETON, supra note 36, at 97. 
38
 OLIVIER ROY, HOLY IGNORANCE 26, 109 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); see also JAMES DAVISON 
HUNTER, TO CHANGE THE WORLD 32, 35 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) (“Culture is, first and foremost, a 
normative order by which we comprehend others, the larger world, and ourselves and through which we individually and 
collectively order our experience. []Particularly in the cultural meaning imputed to such things, culture can be understood 
as symbolic capital.”) (emphasis in original).  
39
 See Jack Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119, 1135-36 (1990). 
40
 See BARTHES, supra note 31, at 51. 
41
 “Signs and Symbols,” supra note 28, at 440. 
42
 BARTHES, supra note 31, at 51; MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS 39-44 (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 
Richard C. McCleary trans. 1964). 
43
 ROY, supra note 38, at 26; see Ravitch, supra note 10, at 1020-21. 
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Catholic, for example, has traditionally been an important part of being Irish—Catholicism informs 
what it means to be Irish—but at the same time Catholicism has been accessed through Irish history 
and culture—what it means to be a Irish has also informed what it means to be Catholic. 
Given the intimacy of religion, history, and culture, it is possible—indeed, likely—that a society 
may so commonly and widely deploy a confessional sign that it seems to lose its confessional 
character. Such a sign might come to be used not only by adherents to the religion it originally and 
ordinarily signified, but also by members of other faiths and by unbelievers.
44
 Christmas trees and 
crosses on national flags are examples of signs whose ordinary meaning has “crossed over” from the 
confessional to the secular.
45
 
II. Cross and Crucifix 
A. Salazar v. Buono 
Buono began as a challenge to a 10-foot high white Latin cross displayed as a memorial to World War 
I veterans on federal park land in California’s Mojave desert.46 The lower federal courts initially held 
that display of the cross violated the Establishment Clause as an endorsement of Christianity,
47
 a 
ruling the federal government declined to appeal to the USSCt.
48
 To forestall permanent removal, 
Congress declared the cross a National Memorial, prohibited the use of federal funds to remove it, and 
transferred the few square yards on which it stood to the nongovernmental American Legion.
49
 The 
original plaintiff then obtained an order that these congressional actions violated the Establishment 
Clause.
50
 This time, the government appealed to the USSCt, and a plurality found the lower courts 
insufficiently attentive to the possibility that the cross was a secular sign of military honor and 
sacrifice that did not endorse Christianity, and thus was fully consistent with the Establishment 
Clause.
51
 It vacated the injunction and remanded the case for consideration of this possibility.
52
 
1. Ordinary Meaning of the Cross 
In the West a Latin cross, without more, is overwhelmingly likely to be understood as the sign of 
Christianity and Christian belief, since for Christians the cross has been the virtually exclusive 
                                                     
44
 Cf. Zarrow, supra note 10, at 513 (“Neutrality among religious would be assured if a member of a minority religion 
would view the symbol displayed as secular or nondenominational.”). 
45
 See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 69-70. 
46
 212 F.Supp.2d at 12-04-05. 
47
 212 F.Supp. 2d at 1217, aff’d, 371 F.3d at 549-50. 
48
 130 S.Ct. at 1813. 
49
 364 F.Supp.2d at 1177, 1181-82, aff’d, 527 F.3d at 771. 
50
 364 F.Supp.2d at 1182, aff’d 527 F.3d at 768, 782-83. 
51
 130 S.Ct. at 1814-21. 
52
 Id. Justice Alito concurred on the Establishment Clause point, but thought remand unnecessary. 130 S.Ct. at 1821-24 
(concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justices Scalia and Thomas would have dismissed for 
plaintiff/appellee’s lack of Article III standing, because the cross became private property after the transfer statute. 130 
S.Ct. at 1824-28 (concurring in the judgment).  
 Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Sotomayor would have affirmed that the transfer statute violated the Establishment 
Clause. 130 S.Ct. at 1848-42 (dissenting opinion). Finally, Justice Breyer found the case controlled by general equitable 
principles and thus would have dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question. 130 S.Ct. at 1842-45 (dissenting 
opinion). 
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emblem in Jesus’s resurrection and his related victory over death and sin for nearly two thousand 
years.
53
 
A common contemporary rendering is the Latin cross, depicting a horizontal line most of the way 
up a vertical line (“ † ”), and believed to resemble the cross on which the Romans crucified Jesus.54 
Another rendering is the Greek cross composed of horizontal and vertical lines intersecting at their 
respective midpoints (“ + ”), used predominantly by the Eastern Orthodox Christian churches. Both 
versions are ubiquitous symbols of Christianity and Christian belief, appearing on altars, gravestones, 
clerical vestments, and military battle flags and banners (as in the Crusades); in sculpture, painting, 
cemeteries, and architecture (especially in connection with churches); and as personal jewelry and 
emblems of clerical office.
55
 
The cross is so closely linked to Christianity that its Christian meaning generally displaces all 
others.
56
 The various courts in Buono were simply stating the semantically obvious in finding that the 
Latin cross is “certainly a Christian symbol,” “the preeminent symbol of Christianity,” “exclusively a 
Christian symbol,” and “not a symbol of any other religion.”57  
2. Alternate Secular Meaning at Veterans Memorial 
Given the ordinary Christian meaning of the cross, its display by government seems to align the 
government with Christianity. But this effect may be displaced by another, depending on the particular 
context in which the cross is displayed. 
For example, crosses were once widely found on signs identifying hospitals, pharmacies, and first-
aid stations—this practice remains common in Europe and the United States.58 The placement of the 
cross where healthcare services are available displaces its ordinary Christian meaning with a secular 
meaning—a place where one might receive medical care.59 
Similarly, crosses are sometimes a component of the corporate logos of entities associated with 
healthcare services, such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, an international association of health insurance 
companies, and the International Red Cross. The distinctive branding effect of such logos 
differentiates their crosses from the Christian cross: Both Blue Cross/Blue Shield and the International 
Red Cross use the Greek cross in addition to (obviously) coloring the cross in blue and red, 
                                                     
53
 See II J.H.A. BOMBERGER, THE PROTESTANT THEOLOGICAL & ECCLESIASTICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 37 (Phil.: Lindsay & 
Blakiston, 1860); RICHARD HARRIES, THE PASSION IN ART 1 (Hants, UK: Ashgate, 2004); CYRIL E. POCKNEE, CROSS AND 
CRUCIFIX IN CHRISTIAN WORSHIP AND DEVOTION 33 (London: A.R. Mowbray, 1962); RICHARD VILADESAU, THE BEAUTY 
OF THE CROSS: THE PASSION OF CHRIST IN THEOLOGY AND THE ARTS, FROM THE CATACOMBS TO THE EVE OF THE 
RENAISSANCE 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) [hereinafter VILADESAU, BEAUTY OF THE CROSS]; e.g, HARRIES, 
supra note 53, at xi (“[I]n the earliest Christian art . . . the Cross and the Resurrection are seen in a unified manner as two 
aspects of one triumph.”). 
54
 BOMBERGER, supra note 53, at 37; “Archaeology of the Cross and Crucifix,” in CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1909), 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04517a.html, at 8-9. 
55
 POCKNEE. supra note 53, at 69-77; “Archaeology of the Cross and Crucifix,” supra note 54, at 13-14. 
56
 BOMBERGER, supra note 53, at 37 (The cross “must, like the atonement completed upon it, be regarded as the most 
peculiar property of Christianity”); Lund, supra note 11, at 1391, (“[T]he cross’s religious meaning is primary. The cross 
is the central symbol of the central event of Christian theology.”). 
57
 212 F.Supp.2d at 1205, aff’d, 527 F.3d at 768-69, rev’d & remanded, 130 S.Ct. at 1816. 
58
 Italian pharmacies, for example, are commonly marked with a lighted green Greek cross, while Greek crosses on a blue 
background are displayed on U.S. interstate highways to signal that a hospital is near an exit. 
59
 One can argue, of course, that even this context bears the trace of less pluralist eras of Western history during which 
Christian clerics and missionaries were virtually the only trained providers of health care. 
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respectively.
60
 The Greek cross is also generally used in the United States and Europe as a traffic sign, 
displayed on a yellow or other distinctively colored background to warn of an approaching 
intersection.  
A secular use of the Latin cross has also emerged in popular culture. Actors, singers, members of 
rock bands, media figures, and ordinary people often wear Latin crosses as jewelry.
61
 While many 
wear it as an emblem of personal Christian faith, others who wear it are often widely known to have 
rejected Christianity, or wear it in situations that apparently contradict Christian beliefs.
62
  
In each of these situations, the ordinary Christian meaning of the cross is successfully displaced by 
other, secular meanings made clear by the precise physical context in which the cross is displayed.  
The Buono plurality likewise portrayed the effect of displaying the cross at a veterans memorial as 
having displaced its ordinary Christian meaning, thus avoiding the unconstitutional Christian 
endorsement that would otherwise seem to follow from its display by the government. The Court 
maintained that the cross communicates a secular meaning of memory and honor, at least when 
displayed at a war memorial or veterans cemetery: 
Although certainly a Christian symbol, the cross was not employed on Sunrise Rock to promote a 
Christian message. Placement of the cross on Government-owned land was not an attempt to set 
the imprimatur of the state on a particular creed. Rather, those who erected the cross intended 
simply to honor our Nation’s fallen soldiers.
63
 
As confirmation of this meaning, the plurality pointed to the vast number of crosses marking graves of 
fallen American servicemen in battlefield cemeteries.
64
 
In short, the plurality concluded that the government’s display of a cross at a veteran’s memorial 
does not align the government with Christianity or coerce or encourage Christian belief, but “simply” 
honors and remembers the sacrifice of American soldiers fallen in defense of the United States. 
This alternate, purportedly secular meaning of the cross raises at least two questions: (a) Is it 
independent of or instead parasitic upon its ordinary Christian meaning? And (b) would its removal 
dishonor all veterans? 
a. Separability  
The plurality ignores whether its proposed secular meaning can be present in the absence of the 
Christian meaning—whether the cross can “simply” convey the secular message of memory and honor 
of wartime veterans, without necessarily and simultaneously signifying Christianity and the Christian 
resurrection? If it cannot, then the alternate secular meaning is not really secular, and thus not an 
alternative to the ordinary Christian meaning. 
The supposed secular meaning of the cross no doubt arose from the proliferation of crosses 
marking the battlefield graves of a military that until the early twentieth century had been 
                                                     
60
 See BlueCross BlueShield Association, http://www.bcbs.com/; International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent 
Societies, http://www.ifrc.org/. As its official name suggests, “red cross” was not secular enough for Muslim societies.  
61
 See Scharffs, supra note 32, at 43-44. 
62
 For example, Madonna’s use of cross imagery in the video rendition of her hit, “Like a Prayer,” was deemed 
blasphemous by many Christians. See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Like_a_Prayer_(song)> (“Reception and protests”). 
Additionally, we are reliably informed by Professor Gedicks’s daughter that a recent contestant on a well-known 
American dating reality show rarely appeared without her Latin-cross pendant even though her behavior seemed rather 
consistently unChristian. 
63
 130 S.Ct. at 1816-17; see also id. at 1817-18 (suggesting that the cross “has complex meaning beyond the expression of 
religious views”); id. at 1820 (concluding that the cross “is a symbol often used to honor and respect those whose heroic 
acts, noble contributions, and patient strivings help secure an honored place in history for this Nation.”). 
64
 130 S.Ct. at 1820. 
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overwhelmingly Christian. But this proposed meaning depends on the cross’s ordinary confessional 
meaning, and thus is not “secular” at all. As Professor Laycock has observed, 
The cross honors Christian soldiers because it symbolizes the promise that they will rise from the 
dead and live forever. To say that the cross honors the Christian dead is not to identify a secular 
meaning of the cross; it is merely to identify a common application of the religious meaning of the 
cross. [T]he Christian cross has no meaning not derived from its primary religious meaning.
65
 
The plurality’s proposed meaning is exposed as Christian in another way. Why choose the cross to 
honor all World War I veterans, when any number of unambiguously secular symbols would just as 
powerfully commemorate their sacrifices? None of the Capitol Mall war memorials and monuments, 
for example, seems to contain a Christian or even a religious symbol.
66
 Congress’s choice of an 
ordinarily Christian symbol, rather than an unambiguously and independently secular one, suggests 
that that the purpose and effect of displaying a Latin cross at the memorial were precisely to align the 
government with Christianity.
67
 
Because the plurality’s proposed secular meaning of the Sunrise cross cannot be separated from its 
ordinary Christian meaning—indeed, is actually dependent upon it—it is not actually secular, and thus 
cannot save the cross from invalidation under the Establishment Clause. 
b. Disrespect 
Though it ignored the performative effect of the government’s displaying the cross, the plurality 
expressed deep concern about the potential performative effect of its removal, opining that this would 
dishonor and disrespect the fallen veterans whose sacrifice the cross was supposed to memorialize.
68
 
But dishonor entails the mistaken assumption that the cross honors all veterans, whereas it really 
honors only Christians. Of course, neither Christian veterans nor those of any other religious group are 
entitled to the military’s exclusive adoption of the sign of their faith, and thus neither Christians nor 
any other group can reasonably claim disrespect when such a sign is removed.
69
  
                                                     
65
 Laycock, supra note 10, at 1239; see also id. at 1240 (“The cross’s power as a symbol, and the story it symbolizes, are 
entirely dependent on the divinity of Jesus. [] Unthinking Christians may intend a cross to honor all the war dead, but that 
does not create any sensible theory by which the cross actually honors nonChristians.”). 
66
 See links to photographs and descriptions under “Landmarks, museums and other features” at 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Mall>. Arlington National Cemetery contains the “Argonne Cross,” erected in the 
early 1920s to mark the section of the cemetery where World War I veterans were interred and named for the Argonne 
Unit of the American Women’s Legion. 
 <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/visitorinformation/MonumentMemorials/ArgonneCross.aspx>. 
67
 Bartrum, supra note 11, at 1661 (“The plurality fails to explain why, if the cross’s religious meaning is not central to its 
symbolism—the easiest solution would not be to replace it with a nonreligious memorial. [I]t seems disingenuous to deny 
that the symbol’s deep religious significance adds something essential to the mix.”); see City & Cty. of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 618 (1989) (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (“Where the government’s secular message can be conveyed 
by two symbols, only one of which carries religious meaning, an observer reasonably might infer from the fact that the 
government has chosen to use the religious symbol that the government means to promote religious faith.”); School Dist. 
v. Schmepp, 374 U.S. , 295 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[W]hat our decisions under the Establishment Clause have 
forbidden, [is] use [of] essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suffice.”); 
e.g., Board of Educ. Of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 6897, 707-08 (1994) (invalidating special public 
school district for disabled school children drawn to coincide with boundaries of Ultra-Orthodox Jewish community 
because, inter alia, less religious-conscious means of accommodating community’s beliefs were available). 
68
 130 S.Ct. at 1817. 
69
 Cf. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601, 612 (“[P]rohibiting the display of a crèche in the courthouse deprives Christians of the 
satisfaction of seeing the government adopt their religious message as their own, but this kind of government affiliation 
with particular religious messages is precisely what the Establishment Clause prohibits. [S]ome Christians may wish to 
see the government proclaim its allegiance to Christianity in a religious celebration of Christmas, but the Constitution 
does not permit the gratification of that desire . . . .”). 
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3. The Latin Cross in American History and Culture 
The plurality maintains that whatever may have been its ordinary meaning when the cross was first 
erected, by the time Congress enacted its memorial designation that meaning had evolved into a 
secular commemoration of military sacrifice.
70
 
Culture is not static, and neither are its symbols. It is certainly conceivable that the meaning of an 
unambiguously confessional symbol might evolve into something predominantly secular, like a 
Christmas tree. Of pagan origin signifying renewal, Christmas trees were adopted by early Christians 
as emblems of the hope of everlasting life associated Jesus’s birth, only to have more recently reverted 
to something resembling their pagan origins—largely secular signs of the holiday season, their 
pervasive, inoffensive secularity confirmed by ubiquitous commercial exploitation.
71
 
The Latin cross has not undergone this sort of semiotic evolution, even when displayed at a 
veterans memorial or cemetery. As Justice Alito conceded, the “thousands of small crosses” marking 
battlefield graves of fallen soldiers are interspersed with hundreds of Stars of David marking the 
battlefield graves of fallen Jewish soldiers.
72
 Indeed, the U.S. military now allows a choice of grave 
markers from among scores of Christian, nonChristian, and nonreligious symbols.
73
 If the cross were 
really a secular symbol of memory and sacrifice, if it did nothing more than honor fallen veterans, it 
alone should suffice to mark and honor the graves of all fallen servicemen.
74
 
It is not hard to imagine that a Jewish veteran or his or her family might feel troubled rather than 
honored by a Christian cross. In fact, one of the original Buono plaintiffs, a decorated Jewish war 
veteran, alleged that as “a sectarian Christian symbol,” the cross “is not meaningful to him.”75 It is 
equally understandable that unbelievers and most other believers outside of the American Christian 
mainstream might not perceive a meaning in the cross that includes them.
76
 Christians were a key 
element in two of the sustained religious persecutions in U.S. history, those of Mormons during the 
late 19
th
 century and Jehovah’s Witnesses during the early 20th.77 Both faiths have forcefully rejected 
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 130 S.Ct. 1817 (finding that over the decades of its existence the cross and its commemorative purpose “had become 
entwined in the public consciousness,” making it “reasonable to interpret the congressional designation as giving 
recognition to the historical meaning that the cross had attained”). 
71
 See generally Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 616; “Christmas tree,” in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 115737/Christmas- tree. 
72
 130 S.Ct. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In American military cemeteries 
overseas, the graves of soldiers who perished in th[e First World W]ar were marked with either a white cross or a white 
Star of David. More than 3,500 Jewish soldiers gave their lives for the United States in World War I.”) 
73
 See http://www.cem.va.gov/cem/docs/emblems.pdf. Some of these markers are also illustrated in LESLIE GRIFFIN, LAW 
AND RELIGION 422 (New York: Thomson Reuters/Foundation, 2nd ed. 2010). 
74
 Cf. Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 637 F.3d 1095, 1112 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that state would 
not have permitted the family of a fallen officer to choose a symbol other than a Latin cross to memorialize a trooper, 
presumably because the state maintained in litigation that the cross is a purely secular symbol of honor and memory), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011). 
75
 212 F.Supp. at 1209. This plaintiff dropped out of the litigation because of questions about his Article III standing, but 
the issue resurfaced at oral argument before the USSCt. 
 Justice Alito noted that it would have been appropriate for Congress to have added the Star of David and other religious 
symbols to the monument. But he lamely excused its failure to do so by speculating that this would not have satisfied the 
cross’s opponents.130 S.Ct. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Of course, whether the 
addition of other confessional symbols would have satisfied the plaintiffs is beside the point; the ordinary Christian 
meaning of the cross does not vanish because a plaintiff acts unreasonably in settlement negotiations. 
76
 See VILADESAU, BEAUTY OF THE CROSS, supra note 53, at 8 (“As a symbol of salvation, the cross has not lost its offensive 
character to those outside the Christian tradition,” such as South Asians, Sunni Muslims, Jews, and unbelievers). 
77
 See, e.g., SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 75-83, 228-33 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); THE 
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the cross as a confessional symbol.
78
 Association of the cross with Christian persecution and 
discrimination is embedded in Jewish and (especially) Muslim culture;
79
 they, too, have rejected it as a 
confessional symbol.
80
 Unbelievers, meanwhile, remain politically and culturally marginalized in the 
U.S., and of course have no use for the cross.
81
 
The ordinary meaning of the Latin cross might conceivably have evolved over the centuries, from 
an exclusively Christian symbol of the resurrection to a largely secular sign of something else, like the 
Christmas tree. If this were true, however, one would expect to find confirming evidence in American 
culture—that is, uses of the cross to depict memory and honor for the military sacrifices of 
nonChristians and nonbelievers personally, as well as collectively by institutions which nonChristians 
and unbelievers control or in which they have substantial influence, just as many unbelievers and some 
nonChristians put up Christmas trees every December. 
There is no cultural evidence, however, that the Latin cross has been embraced by American 
unbelievers or nonChristian believers as a religiously neutral signifier of military honor and 
sacrifice—or, indeed, of anything other than Christianity.82 The record in Buono itself confirms this, 
showing that the cross at the World War I memorial was a regular site for Easter sunrise services, but 
not for celebrations by nonChristians or unbelievers or for secular ceremonies on Veterans Day, 
Memorial Day, or other secular holidays with military significance.
83
 As plaintiff’s counsel pointed 
out at oral argument, there are no crosses in Jewish cemeteries.
84
 Congressional designation of the 
cross as a veterans memorial did not make the cross secular, it made the memorial Christian.
85
  
(Contd.)                                                                  
PERSECUTION OF JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: THE RECORD OF VIOLENCE AGAINST A RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION UNPARALLELED 
IN AMERICA SINCE THE ATTACKS ON THE MORMONS (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, Jan. 1941). 
78
 For Mormons, see MICHAEL G. REED, BANISHING THE CROSS: THE EMERGENCE OF A MORMON TABOO 33-85 passim, 113-
20 (Independence, Mo.: John Whitmer, 2012); e.g., Gordon B. Hinckley, The Symbol of Our Faith, THE ENSIGN (Apr. 
2005), at 3 (“[F]or us, the cross is the symbol of the dying Christ, while our message is a declaration of the Living 
Christ.”). In the 1960s, the LDS church obtained approval of a distinctively Mormon military grave marker so that the 
burial sites of LDS servicemen and -women would not be marked by a cross. REED, supra, at 121-22. 
 For Jehovah’s Witnesses see “Why True Christians Do Not Use the Cross in Worship,” 
 http://www.jw.org/en/publications/books/bible-teach/why-true-christians-do-not-use-the-cross-in-worship/; Leolaia, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Cross, Jehovah’s Witness Discussion Forum (1990), http://www.aggelia.be/jwcross.pdf. 
Jehovah’s Witnesses also have their own distinctive military grave marker which lacks a cross. 
79
 See, e.g., T. Jeremy Gunn, Islam, Europe, and Emerging Legal Issues, in ISLAM, EUROPE, AND EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 
111, 112 (Cole Durham, et. al. eds. 2012); see also KAREN ARMSTRONG, HOLY WAR: THE CRUSADES AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON ODAY’S WORLD xvii (New York: Anchor, 2nd ed. 2001); cf. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) (striking 
down state constitutional amendment approved with strong conservative Christian support that singled out Sharia law for 
special disabilities). 
80
 E.g., WILLIAM K. EMERSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED STATES ARMY: INSIGNIA AND UNIFORMS 268 (recounting how 
during World War II, Army-commissioned Jewish chaplains insisted on a different insignia than the cross that had 
theretofore identified all Army chaplains, because they considered the cross offensive when worn by rabbis); REED, supra 
note 78, at 89, 91-92 (recounting opposition of Salt Lake City rabbis to cross memorial proposed in early 20th century); 
supra note 75 & accompanying text (opposition of Jewish war veteran to Sunrise Cross). 
81
 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 10, at 357-75; Jennifer Groesock, Note, No Freedom from Religion: The Marginalization of 
Atheists in Amerian Society, Politics, and Law, 1 MARGINS 569 (2001). 
82
 For example, every authorized military marker for a mainstream Christian faith includes a cross, while of the 29 markers 
authorized for unblievers, nonChristians, or Christians outside the orthodox mainstream, only one includes a cross. See 
<http://www.cem.va.gov/cem/docs/emblems.pdf>; GRIFFIN supra note 73, at 422. See also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 12, 
at 976 (arguing that permanent display of cross on altar or pulpit of university chapel open to use by all faiths “cannot 
readily be harmonized with nonChristian use of the space”). 
83
 See 130 S.Ct. at 1838 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (analyzing and summarizing record to show incorrectness of plurality’s 
unsupported assertion that secular memorial ceremonies were regularly held at the cross). 
84
 Counsel, who is apparently Jewish, made the statement in response to Justice Scalia’s expression of outrage that one 
might think the cross did not honor Jewish veterans: “The cross is the most common symbol of the resting place of 
Frederick Mark Gedicks and Pasquale Annicchino 
14 
B. Lautsi & Others v. Italy 
Lautsi began with two Italian parents who asked that crucifixes displayed in classrooms of the middle 
school where their two sons attended be removed.
86
 School and regional administrators not only 
rejected their request, but followed with a circular to public school principals expressly recommending 
the crucifix’s classroom display.87 The boys’ mother then filed suit in the Tribunale Administrative 
Regionale Veneto, the Italian administrative court in the Veneto Region having original jurisdiction, 
asking that the administrators’ decision be annulled as a violation of the fundamental Italian principle 
of laicità.
88
 
Difficult to translate—it literally means “laic-ness” or “laicity”—Italian laicità is usually defined as 
“inclusive” state religious neutrality or government “equidistance” with respect to all forms of belief 
and unbelief.
89
 It is distinct from “secularism,” which Italians associate with French laïcité and 
(somewhat inaccurately) American separationism.
90
 The term does not appear in the Italian 
Constitution; it emerged in the wake of the 1984 Villa Madam Accords between Italy and the Holy 
See, which transformed Italy from a confessional to a secular state but expressly recognized 
Catholicism as part of Italy’s “historical heritage.”91 Laicità is now well-established as a fundamental 
(albeit nontextual) Italian constitutional norm limiting government action.
92
 
Specifically at issue were two fascist-era royal decrees previously held valid and enforceable in 
contemporary republican Italy.
93
 One, issued in 1924, requires that every middle school “have the 
national flag” and every classroom, “the symbol of the Crucifix.”94 The other, issued in 1928, lists 
required furnishings for various public school classrooms, including a crucifix for each elementary 
school classroom.
95
 
Finding that the plaintiff’s case for the constitutional invalidity of the decrees was “not manifestly 
unfounded,” the Tribunale referred the case in accordance with Italian procedure to the Corte 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Christians. I have been in Jewish cemeteries. There is never a cross on a tombstone of a Jew.” Tr. Oral Arg., at 38-39, 
Buono, 130 S.Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472). 
85
 See 130 S.Ct. at 1839 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
86
 Sentenza N. 56/04, Ric. No. 2007/02 (Trib. Ammin. Reg. Veneto – Sez. I Nov. 13, 2003), at 2. 
87
 Sentenza N. 56/04, at 5 ¶ 2.3.1. 
88
 Sentenza N. 56/04, at 2-3. 
89
 See Marco Ventura, Italy, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: RELIGION 17, ¶ 74 at 50 (Alphen aan den Rijn, 
The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, Rik Torfs ed. 2013) (defining laicità as a “[s]upreme principle of Italian constitutional 
law . . . implying the equidistance and neutrality of the State towards all religious denominations,” and derivable from 
constitutional principles of “equality, non-discrimination on grounds of religion, and independence of the State from the 
Catholic Church”); e.g., Sentenza N. 1110/2005, Ric. No. 2007/02 (Trib. Ammin. Reg. Veneto – Sez. III Mar. 17, 2005), 
at 23 ¶ 7.1 (defining lacità as the “a-confessionality” of the state) (authors’ translation); Sentenza N. 203, ¶ 4 (Corte Cost. 
Dec 14, 1989) (“The principle of laicità . . . implies not an indifference of the State with respect to religions but a 
guarantee of the State for the safeguarding of religious liberty in a regime of confessional and cultural pluralism.”) 
(authors’ translation). 
90
 See LORENZO ZUCCA, A SECULAR EUROPE 101 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) (“[S]ecularism must be sharply 
separated from neutrality. Neutrality is inclusive, secularism is exclusive. The Italian government is firmly committed to 
neutrality, but not to secularism. In fact neutrality means that the state should refrain from promoting secularism which 
amounts to a form of proselytism.”). 
91
 See Pin, supra note 11, at 120-27. Professor Pin argues that initially laicità was characterized by a “strong connection and 
collaboration” between church and state which supported state display of Catholic symbols, and only later evolved into a 
mandate of “some” church/state separation. See id. at 134-35. 
92
 Sentenza N. 203, ¶¶ 4 & 9. 
93
 See Sentenza N. 63/88 (Cons. Stato – Sez. II Apr. 27, 1988). 
94
 Art. 118, cap. XII, r.d. n. 965/24 (Apr. 30, 1924) [hereinafter 1924 Decree] (authors’ translation). 
95
 Art. 119, tab. C, r.d. n. 1297 (Apr. 26, 1928) [hereinafter 1928 Decree]. 
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Costituzionale, the appellate court in Italy charged with ruling on the constitutionality of statutes and 
laws.
96
 The Corte, however, held that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of 
administrative (as opposed to legislative) actions, and remanded the case back to the Tribunale.
97
  
On remand, the Tribunale upheld classroom crucifix displays, finding that the practice conformed 
to laicità because the crucifix merely signifies (i) the Christian origins of secular values recited in the 
Italian Constitution,
98
 and (ii) the Catholic roots of Italian history and culture.
99
 The Consiglio di Stato 
affirmed, relying only on the Tribunale’s first rationale.100 On plaintiff’s appeal to the ECtHR, that 
court’s seven-judge Second Section unanimously reversed, finding that the predominantly Catholic 
meaning of the crucifix infringed student and parental rights to freedom from Catholicism and upset 
religious pluralism in the classroom by suggesting that “the State takes the side of Catholicism,”101 in 
violation of the European Convention of Human Rights.
102
 The Second Section decision, in turn, was 
reversed by a 17-judge Grand Chamber of the ECtHR,
103
 which found that perpetuating a tradition of 
displaying crucifixes in classrooms as secular “passive” symbols of culture and religious freedom was 
within the “margin of appreciation” granted to Convention signatories to adapt its principles to their 
particular national circumstances.
104
 
1. The Ordinary Meaning of the Crucifix 
In contrast to the unadorned Latin cross, the crucifix depicts Jesus nailed to the cross. It emerged as a 
Christian symbol in the 4
th
 or early 5
th
 century.
105
 Early crucifixes generally showed a fully-clothed 
and triumphal Jesus “alive and reigning” on the cross.106 It was not until the Middle Ages that Christ 
was shown dead on the cross,
107
 and not until the late Middle Ages did crucifixes generally depict a 
realistically crucified Jesus—almost naked and bloodily nailed to the cross, with bowed head and eyes 
closed in mortal suffering and death.
108
 
The crucifix is closely associated with the Catholic Church, though it is also used by Eastern 
Orthodox Christianity. Reformation Protestants (especially Calvinists) rejected it as an aspect of the 
                                                     
96
 Sentenza n. 56/04, at 13-15 ¶¶ 5.3 & 6 (authors’ translation). 
97
 Ordinanza n. 389 (Corte Cost. Dec. 13, 2004) (authors’ translation). 
98
 Sentenza N. 1110/2005, Ric. No. 2007/02 (Trib. Ammin. Reg. Veneto – Sez. III Mar. 17, 2005), at 31-35 ¶¶ 11.1-11.9. 
99
 E.g., Sentenza N. 1110/2005, at 28-29, ¶¶ 8.1-8.3. 
100
 Decisione N. 7314 Reg. Ric. N. 556/06 (Cons. Stato Feb. 13, 2006), at 16. 
101
 Lautsi, at 12-13 ¶¶ 51-55. 
102
 See EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, art. 9; id., prot. no. 1, art. 2., (Coun. Eur. - Rome Nov. 4, 
1950), http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#P1. 
103
 For a description of ECtHR procedures relating to section panel and grand chamber proceedings, see Witte & Arnold, 
supra note 11, at 15-16. 
104
 Lautsi & Others, at 27-31 ¶¶ 63-77. 
105
 BOMBERGER, supra note 53, at 38; POCKNEE. supra note 53, at 38-39; “Archaeology of the Cross and Crucifix,” supra 
note 54, at 17-19. 
106
 BOMBERGER, supra note 53, at 39; HARRIES, supra note 53, at 10-11, 18-19; see RICHARD VLIADESAU, THE BEAUTY OF 
THE CROSS 62-69 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) [hereinafter VILADESAU, BEAUTY OF THE CROSS] . 
107
 HARRIES, supra note 53, at 28-30 (mid-7th century); VILADESAU, BEAUTY OF THE CROSS, supra note 53/106, at 48 (mid-9th 
century). 
108
 BOMBERGER, supra note 53, at 39; HARRIES, supra note 53, at 48, 65-66; POCKNEE. supra note 53, at 48, 63, 65, 66; 
“Archaeology of the Cross and Crucifix,” supra note 54, at 20-21; VILADESAU, BEAUTY OF THE CROSS, supra note 
53/106, at 155-58; e.g., RICHARD VILADESAU, THE TRIUMPH OF THE CROSS: THE PASSION OF CHRIST IN THEOLOGY AND THE 
ARTS, FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE COUNTER-REFORMATION 12-13 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
[hereinafter VILADESAU, TRIUMPH OF THE CROSS] (discussing Fra Angelico’s “St. Dominic in Adoration before the 
Crucifix” (ca. 1440-45)). 
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Catholic veneration of icons, but its use persisted among Anglicans, Lutherans, and Methodists into 
the 17
th
 century.
109
 Since the 19
th
 century its use has been almost entirely confined to Catholicism and 
Eastern Orthodoxy, and it is widely understood as the quintessential Roman Catholic sign.
110
 
The ECtHR Grand Chamber barely admitted the ordinary Catholic meaning of the crucifix. It 
laconically described the crucifix as “above all a religious symbol” which “undoubtedly refers to 
Christianity.”111 The Consiglio di Stato did little better, conceding that “the crucifix is properly and 
exclusively a ‘religious symbol,’ insofar as it seeks to encourage a bond of reverence towards the 
founder of the Christian religion,” but only in a “place of worship,” foreshadowing the ECtHR’s use of 
performative effect to empty the crucifix of any confessional meaning at all.
112
 The Tribunale evaded 
the problem entirely by flatly equating the Catholic crucifix with the Christian cross.
113
  
One must consult lower court decisions that were vacated or overruled for a detailed account of the 
crucifix’s ordinary Catholic meaning. The Tribunale that first referred the action to the Corte 
Costituzionale had no trouble conceding that the crucifix is obviously and ordinarily understood 
throughout Italy as the quintessential sign of Catholicism and Catholic belief, observing that its 
classroom display “honors an unambiguous confessional meaning, perceived as such by the largest 
part of those associated with the school . . . .”114 Likewise, the Second Section of the ECtHR found 
that the crucifix’s Catholic meaning predominated over all others,115 and expressed its skepticism that 
“display in state-school classrooms of a symbol that it is reasonable to associate with Catholicism (the 
majority religion of Italy)” would serve the religious educational pluralism and liberal-democratic 
values guaranteed by the Convention.
116
 
There is little doubt that in Italy the crucifix, without more, is ordinarily understood as the sign of 
the Catholic Church and Catholic belief.  
2. Alternate Secular Meaning in Public School Classroom 
Given the ordinary Catholic meaning of the crucifix, its display by government seems to align it with 
Roman Catholicism. As with the Latin cross, this expected effect might be displaced by another which 
renders the crucifix secular or otherwise appropriate when placed in the requisite physical context. 
The controlling opinions in Lautsi present a semiotic regression on this point, in which a detailed 
account of the crucifix’s purportedly secular performative effect is successively diluted until it drops 
                                                     
109
 BOMBERGER, supra note 53, at 38; POCKNEE, supra note 53, at 76-77, VILADESAU, TRIUMPH OF THE CROSS, supra note 
108, at 128-33. 
110
 See, e.g., J. HOPPENOT, LE CRUCIFIX 6 (Paris: Desclée, De Brouwer, 5th ed. 1905). 
The crucifix is the epitome of Catholic dogma: the person of him who suffers on it, the only Son of God the Father, 
conceived in Mary’s womb by power of the Holy Spirit, reminds us of the two great mysteries of the Trinity and the 
Incarnation. [] The crucifix is the memorial to Christian morality. Pagan morality said, “Let us eat and drink, for 
tomorrow we die.” Against these facile principles, the cross tells you, “You are of Christ, crucify your flesh with its vices 
and sins. 
 Id. (authors’ translation) (emphasis in original); see also Gunn, supra note 79, at 112 (“The Catholic Church . . . places 
the crucifix at the focal point of its churches. The sacred Mass, which employs crucifixes as part of the ceremony, 
commemorates the crucifixion of Christ”). 
111
 Lautsi & Others, at 27-28 ¶ 66. 
112
 Decisione N. 556/06, N. 7314/2005 Reg. Dec. (Cons. Stato Jan. 13, 2006), at 15 (authors’ translation); see infra Part II-
B-2. 
113
 Sentenza n. 1110/2005, at 13-14 (authors’ translation). 
114
 Sentenza n. 56/04, Ric. No. 2007/02 (Trib. Ammin. Reg. Veneto – Sez. I Nov. 13, 2003), at 12 (authors’ translation). 
115
 Lautsi, at 12 ¶¶51, 53 (citation omitted). 
116
 Lautsi, at 13 ¶ 56. 
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out of the case entirely. The Tribunale gave a rich (and controversial) account of the crucifix’s 
purported secular meanings, concluding that it signified the Christian foundation of secular Italian 
culture and universal human rights.
117
 On appeal, the Consiglio agreed in part, holding that classroom 
crucifixes communicated the Catholic origins of secular human liberty.
118
 Finally, the Grand Chamber 
of the ECtHR found the crucifix’s ordinary Catholic meaning wholly displaced without identifying 
any alternate secular meaning, holding that the crucifix is an “essentially passive” symbol that does 
not religiously influence school children in the absence of affirmative efforts by the school to coerce 
Catholic practice or belief.
119
  
a. Secular Liberty & Secular History 
The Tribunale began by observing that “in the public schools in which children are necessarily 
introduced to the values of liberty, democracy, and the laicità of the State, it is not legal to impose any 
type of religious belief . . .,”120 and emphasizing the powerful obligation of religious impartiality that 
laicità imposes on the state.
121
 
Laicità’s constitutional premises of state theological equidistance and nonconfessionalism imposed 
on the Tribunale the difficult task of delivering a plausible account of the crucifix as a secular rather 
than (merely) Catholic symbol. It began by emphasizing that the crucifix is “also an historical-cultural 
symbol, and thus endowed with a value of identity in reference to [the Italian] people.”122 Neither 
historical analysis nor even the constitutional value of laicità, observed the Tribunale, can change an 
Italian past saturated with Christianity.
123
 An understanding of the crucifix as a mere symbol of Italian 
history and culture, it concluded, would be sufficient to dismiss the plaintiff’s action, because a sign 
that  
summarizes relevant aspects of our society, of our humanistic culture as well as our popular 
conscience, would not damage in any way the laicità of the State or the objectives of public school 
instruction and thus the sphere of liberty of every citizen.
124
 
The problem, admitted the Tribunale, is that the crucifix cannot plausibly be viewed as merely an 
historical-cultural symbol, but must also satisfy laicità as the confessional symbol it is ordinarily 
understood to be.
125
 Having candidly confessed the semiotic difficulty of separating the crucifix’s 
ordinary confessional from its purportedly secular meaning—something the Buono plurality failed to 
do—the Tribunale then (rather less candidly) pulled a rhetorical “bait and switch”: Having to this 
point discussed the meaning of the “crucifix,” the court inexplicably changed to a discussion of the 
meaning of the “cross,” as if one were indistinct from the other.126 
                                                     
117
 See infra Part II-B-2-a. 
118
 See infra Part II-B-2-b. 
119
 See infra Part II-B-2-c. 
120
 Sentenza n. 1110/2005, at 24 ¶ 7.1 (authors’ translation). 
121
 Sentenza n. 1110/2005, at 24-25, 26 ¶¶ 7.2, 7.4. 
122
 Sentenza n. 1110/2005, at 28 ¶ 8.1 (authors’ translation) (emphasis in original). 
123
 Sentenza n. 1110/2005, at 28 ¶ 8.1. 
124
 Sentenza n. 1110/2005, at 29 ¶ 8.3 (authors’ translation). 
125
 Sentenza n. 1110/2005, at 29-30 ¶ 9.1. 
126
 The court relied on the fact that individual schools had sometimes displayed unadorned crosses in response to the fascist-
era decrees requiring display of the crucifix. Sentenza n. 1110/2005, at 13-14 ¶¶ 4.1-4.2. As another fascist-era decree 
made clear, however, the substitution of cross for crucifix was not a general dispensation, but a specific concession to the 
Waldensians (Valdesi), a small pre-Reformation Christian sect which rejects the crucifix and in the 1920s was almost 
entirely concentrated in rural Sicily and remote areas of the French-Italian Alps. See Sentenza n. 1110/2005, Ric. N. 
2007./02 (Trib. Ammin. Reg. Veneto – Sez. III Mar. 17, 2005) (citing Circolare n. 8823 (Ministero Pubb. Instru. 1923)). 
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The switch to cross from crucifix made it easier to conform its use by government with laicità. The 
unadorned cross is “understood as the symbol of Christianity, not simply that of Catholicism, and thus 
also captures beyond Catholicism itself the values of the other Christian confessions present” in 
Italy,
127
 a claim that could not have been made for the crucifix. But even granting the ecumenical 
character of the cross, it does not reach nonChristian confessions or unbelievers, is not ordinarily 
secular, and is not relevant to any secular meaning of the crucifix. 
Having equated crucifix with cross, the court initiated a detailed explication of Christianity as the 
root of human virtue and, in particular, those virtues grounding universal human rights.
128
 The words 
“crucifix” and “cross” both appear in this lengthy passage, but the court uses “cross” whenever it 
emphasizes the purportedly open and inclusive character of Christianity.
129
 The point was to establish 
that the cross and the crucifix symbolize Christian charity and care for the other, values that also 
ground the post-confessional Italian republic: 
Christianity, . . . with its strong accent on the precept of love for one’s neighbor and even more 
with the explicit predominance of charity in one’s faith, contains in essence those ideas of 
tolerance, equality, and liberty that are at the base of the modern secular state, and the Italian state 
in particular. 
Looking beyond the superficial, one discerns a line of thought that gathers in itself the Christian 
revolution of two thousand years ago, the affirmation in Europe of habeas corpus, the very 
cardinal elements of Enlightenment (even though historically posed in lively contrast with 
religion), that is, the liberty and dignity of man, the declaration of the rights of man, and ultimately 
the very laicità of the modern state; all of these historical phenomena are in a significant way—
though certainly not exclusively—in the Christian conception of the world.
130
 
The court even went so far as to associate Christianity with the motto of the profoundly anti-clerical 
French revolution.
131
 
From this premise, the Court concludes that laicità is so well established as a constitutional 
principle that there is little danger in the court’s entertaining a “new and contemporary” secular 
meaning for the cross, notwithstanding its ordinary Christian one.
132
 It then takes this new secular 
meaning of the Chrtistian cross and imputes it to the Catholic crucifix: As both  
the symbol of a particular historical and cultural national identity” and “the expression of secular 
principles of the community . . . the crucifix can be legitimately placed in the classrooms of public 
schools, in that it not only doesn’t clash with but indeed affirms and confirms the principle of the 
laicità of the republican State.
133
 
Thus, the Tribunale concluded: “The crucifix is the symbol of our history and our culture and, as a 
consequence, of our identity . . . and also of the laicità of the State.”134 
The Tribunale decision is an unsubtle sleight-of-hand. It dubiously asserted an identity of meaning 
between the Christian cross and the Catholic crucifix. It then identified Christian values symbolized by 
the cross, and asserted (again dubiously) that these also form the exclusive basis of Italian 
                                                     
127
 Sentenza n. 1110/2005, at 30 ¶ 9.2 (‘“[L]iberté, egalité, fraternité,’ constitutes a motto easily shared by a Christian, albeit 
with obvious emphasis on the third term.”)(authors’ translation). 
128
 Sentenza n. 1110/2005, at 31-42 ¶¶ 11.1-15.2. 
129
 Sentenza n. 1110/2005, at 31-42 ¶¶ 11.1-15.2. 
130
 See, e.g., Sentenza n. 1110/2005, at 31-32 ¶ 11.1 (authors’ translation) (emphasis added). 
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 See, e.g., Sentenza n. 1110/2005 at 32 ¶ 11.2.  
132
 Sentenza n. 1110/2005, at 41-42 ¶ 15.2 (authors’ translation). 
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 Sentenza n. 1110/2005, at 42 ¶ 16.2 (authors’ translation). 
134
 Id. at 38 ¶ 12.4 (authors’ translation) (emphasis added).  
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constitutional and fundamental secular human rights.
135
 Concluding that government display of the 
cross does not violate laicità, it simply substituted Catholic crucifix for Christian cross to hold that 
display of the crucifix conforms to laicità as well, notwithstanding its ordinary Catholic meaning. 
b. Secular Liberty 
On appeal from the Tribunale, the Consiglio di Stato reasoned that while the crucifix was undoubtedly 
a religious symbol when displayed in a place of worship, it might also communicate secular values 
when displayed in a nonreligious venue like a public school: 
 [F]or believers and nonbelievers the [crucifix’s] display will be justified and will assume a 
nondiscriminatory meaning under its religious profile, if it is able to represent and to precisely 
recall in an immediately perceptible and intuitive form . . . relevant civic values, and to call 
particular attention to those values that suggest and inspire our constitutional order, the base of our 
shared civil life. In this sense the crucifix can develop, even in a “secular” context different from 
the religious context that is its natural home, a highly educational symbolic function, regardless of 
the religion professed by the pupils.
136
  
In other words, the performative effect of displaying the crucifix in a public school classroom 
displaces its ordinary Catholic meaning with an alternative secular one, namely,  
the religious origin of the values of tolerance, mutual respect, regard for the individual, the 
affirmation of his or her rights and regard for his or her liberty, freedom of conscience against 
authority, human solidarity, prohibition of every discrimination, all of which characterize the 
Italian civic order.
137
 
How and why the crucifix does this is left unexplained, though the Consiglio is obviously indebted to 
the Tribunale’s comparable analysis. The Consiglio suggests that there is no other symbol “in Italian 
culture . . . better suited” to encapsulate these secular values “than the crucifix,”138 and then defers to 
the Veneto Ministry’s judgment that the crucifix is the most effective means of teaching Italian civic 
virtue.
139
 
This argument implicitly concedes that the ordinary Catholic meaning of the crucifix is out of place 
in a public school. Accordingly, its display there must signify something else, something 
nonconfessional—like Italian constitutional and civic values—as if it were inconceivable that Italian 
public school authorities might violate the religious impartiality demanded by laicità by posting an 
obviously confessional symbol. In the view of the Consiglio, that display of the crucifix occurs in a 
public school necessarily displaces its ordinary Catholic meaning with the alternate, secular meaning 
of Italian civic unity, though it leaves unexplained why this must be the case. 
c. (Almost) No Effect  
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR largely adopted the position of the Italian government that the 
“mere presence” of a “passive symbol” like the crucifix could not violate the Convention without 
proof that children were coerced or pressured or the teaching atmosphere otherwise lacked the 
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 As Professor Mancini has pointed out, many of the personal rights and liberties listed in the Italian Constitution were 
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 Sentenza n. 556/06, at 16 (authors’ translation). 
138
 Sentenza n. 556/06, at 17 (authors’ translation). 
139
 Sentenza n. 556/06, at 18 (authors’ translation). 
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religious impartiality.
140
 Unlike the Italian government, however, which attributed various secular 
meanings to the crucifix,
141
 the ECtHR decided the case without adopting any alternate meaning at all 
in place of the majoritarian Catholic significance it grudgingly admitted at the outset.
142
 Conceding 
that classroom posting of crucifixes “confer[s] on [Italy]’s majority religion preponderant visibility in 
the school environment,” the ECtHR nevertheless agreed with the government that as “an essentially 
passive symbol” the crucifix “cannot be deemed to have an influence on pupils comparable to that of 
didactic speech or participation in religious activities,”143 especially given lack of “compulsory 
teaching about Christianity” or other evidence that “the authorities were intolerant of pupils who 
believed in other religions, were non-believers or who held non-religious philosophical 
convictions.”144 
The ECtHR reasoned that the physical context of the public school classroom in which the crucifix 
is displayed neutralized its ordinary Catholic meaning even in the absence of an alternate secular 
meaning. Its decision constitutes an implicit judgment that the purportedly open, religiously neutral, 
and plural environment of Italian public schools diluted the ordinary Catholic meaning it would 
otherwise communicate, to the point that it was apparently undetectable.  
This contrasts with the ECtHR’s Second Section opinion, which held that the Convention requires 
government “to refrain from imposing beliefs, even indirectly, in places where persons are dependent 
on [government] or in places where they are particularly vulnerable,” such as elementary and middle 
schools.
145
 It seems a matter of common sense that “in countries where the great majority of the 
population owe allegiance to one particular religion the manifestation of the observances and symbols 
of that religion, without restriction as to place and manner, may constitute pressure on students who do 
not practice that religion or those who adhere to another religion.”146 The record showed that “it is 
impossible not to notice crucifixes in the classrooms,” and that the Italian government considers them 
“an integral part of the school environment.”147 The Section therefore concluded that the ordinary 
Catholic meaning of the crucifix served to align the government with Catholicism: 
The presence of the crucifix may easily be interpreted by pupils of all ages as a religious sign, and 
they will feel that they have been brought up in a school environment marked by a particular 
religion. What may be encouraging for some religious pupils may be emotionally disturbing for 
pupils of other religions or those who profess no religion. That risk is particularly strong among 
pupils belonging to religious minorities. Negative freedom of religion is not restricted to the 
absence of religious services or religious education. It extends to practices and symbols 
expressing, in particular or in general, a belief, a religion or atheism. That negative right deserves 
special protection if it is the Sate which expresses a belief and dissenters are placed in a situation 
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from which they cannot extract themselves if not by making disproportionate efforts and acts of 
sacrifice.
148
 
By contrast, the Grand Chamber gave outsized importance to the margin of appreciation. Deferring to 
the Italian government by use of this doctrine theoretically implies that there is a nationally accepted 
secular understanding of the crucifix rooted in Italian history and culture. As we shall see, however, 
there is no authentic Italian narrative in which the crucifix functions as a secular historical-cultural 
symbol embraced by unbelievers and non-Catholics.
149
 
In sum, the Grand Chamber opinion simply denies that display of the crucifix has any meaning or 
effect at all, its being just a “passive” symbol. 
3. The Crucifix in Italian History and Culture 
Like Buono, Lautsi involves assertions about Italian history and culture that underwrite the defense of 
the classroom crucifix displays: The ordinary Catholic meaning of the crucifix is displaced by 
alternate secular meanings (as the Italian courts held) or, at least, is displaced by the secular classroom 
context even if no alternate secular meaning takes its place (as held by the ECtHR Grand Chamber). 
Accordingly, one should be able to look for confirming evidence in Italian history and culture of the 
proposed alternative secular meanings and effects of the crucifix (or the absence of confessional 
meaning and effect). 
Italy has experienced wide swings and violent alterations in its forms of government and their 
relationship to the Papacy and the Church since just the mid-19
th
 century. This complex history can 
only be sketched here. We emphasize as well that our purpose is not to make normative judgments, 
but rather to test whether the claimed secular meanings and effects (or its failure to project 
confessional meaning and effect) cohere with Italian history and culture.  
a. Papal Absolutism 
From the 8
th
 through most of the 19
th
 century, with some interruption, a strategic swath of central Italy 
was ruled by the Pope as an absolute temporal monarch.
150
 Beyond these Papal or Pontifical States, the 
Pope sought to impose his will on the feudal kingdoms of Europe even in what today we would call 
“secular” matters,151 claiming the power to depose kings and emperors by his power of 
excommunication.
152
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150
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University Press, Jonathan Morris rev. & updated ed. 2001). 
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ITALIANS 162, 302-05 (New York: Atheneum, 1977); HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 90-91 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983). As Galileo discovered, however, papal power was real enough to impose the 
Inquisition in the Papal States and the rest of Italy. See BARZINI, supra, at 314. 
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modern periods; the Church and the State each exercised power in both realms. See, e.g., BRAGUE, supra note 150, at 136; 
Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzmann, Against Religious Institutionalism 11 (Sept. 2012), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2152060. 
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Frederick Mark Gedicks and Pasquale Annicchino 
22 
The Latin cross was a sign of the temporal and spiritual power of the Church throughout Europe.
153
 
In the Papal States, the crucifix was ubiquitous in government venues and many commercial and 
private ones. 
b. Opposition to Liberal Constitutional Government 
Most of the Papal States fell to the armies of the Italian unification movement in 1861, which then 
proclaimed the Kingdom of Italy, a liberal, anti-clerical, constitutional monarchy governing most of 
the Italian peninsula.
154
 Rome and its environs remained under papal control until 1870, when the new 
monarchy occupied and annexed Rome, confining the Pope to the tiny enclave of Vatican City and 
opening a schism with the Church that lasted nearly 60 years.
155
 
The practical independence and political freedom of action afforded the Papacy by the Papal States 
vanished with its loss of Rome and the rest of the States.
156
 The Church’s consequent exclusion from 
governing power in any part of Italy also undermined its ability to govern the practice of Catholicism 
in its historical, cultural, and geographical homeland.
157
 
The annexation of Rome in 1870 unified Italy politically but not socially or culturally.
158
 Outside of 
the Papal States, the Italian had consisted for centuries of shifting and diverse kingdoms, duchies, 
republics, city-states, and enclaves periodically occupied or controlled by foreign powers.
159
 In short, 
the people of the new Italian state had little in common other than Roman Catholicism. 
Pope Pius IX, however, moved quickly to prevent Catholicism from being used to unify the 
peoples of Italy. Aiming at the restoration of the Papal States (especially Rome),
160
 and deeply 
suspicious of liberal, constitutional, and other modernist values,
161
 he issued the non expedit, which 
declared it “not expedient” for Catholics to participate in the political life of the new state by voting, 
holding office, participating in its functions, or otherwise recognizing its legitimacy.
162
 Enforced by 
the Pope’s power of excommunication,163 the non expedit was a powerful obstacle to effective 
government in the early years of the monarchy, especially in the South, splitting the Kingdom into 
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pro- and anti-Catholic factions and foreclosing any possibility that Catholicism might act as a unifying 
national force.
164
  
Nevertheless, the new Kingdom of Italy succeeded in introducing substantial religious liberty and 
in liberalizing the law of church and state, despite its formally confessional character and the 
determined opposition of the Church.
165
 Its policy was captured in Camillo Cavour’s phrase, “A free 
Church in a free State.”166 These were accompanied, however, by widespread suppression of Catholic 
orders and institutions and expropriation of their property.
167
 Speaking of the Kingdom of Italy after 
unification, Professor Ventura observes that “liberalism was its political source of inspiration, 
secularized (often anti-clerical) bourgeois society was its social reference, and policies limiting the 
influence of the Catholic Church and expanding the powers of the State in areas traditionally reserved 
to the Church were its natural inclination.”168  
c. Alignment with Fascism  
Benito Mussolini established a Fascist dictatorship in the early 1920s, though he retained the 
monarchy as part of the formal constitutional apparatus.
169
 Italian Fascism was profoundly anti-clerical 
and had even less use for Catholicism than its predecessor liberal regime.
170
 Having come to power by 
a threatened coup,
171
 however, Mussolini’s government had a legitimacy problem, which he proposed 
to solve by courting the support of the Church.
172
 The Fascist government began to rebuild the 
Church/State relationship that had fractured with unification and the annexation of Rome.
173
 It 
unilaterally issued of the crucifix decrees at issue in Lautsi,
174
 and otherwise signaled that it was open 
to reconciling the Italian state with the Church. The Pope, for his part, had still not fully accepted the 
new Italian state,
175
 but by then had also decided that liberalism, socialism, and communism were 
bigger threats than Fascism.
176
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Negotiations eventually yielded the “Lateran Pacts,” a “treaty” between the Kingdom of Italy and 
the Church named for the Vatican palace in which they were executed. They expressly provided for 
recognition of the Papacy as a tiny but sovereign entity demarcated by the borders of Vatican City, and 
formally declared Roman Catholicism the sole state religion of Italy, with accompanying powers and 
privileges including tax exemption and compulsory teaching of Catholicism in public schools.
177
 The 
Church also received an enormous sum as reparations for its loss of Rome and the Papal States, as 
well as continuing financial support for its “social welfare” ministries. In return, the Church officially 
recognized the Kingdom of Italy and thus, by unmistakable implication, the legitimacy of Mussolini’s 
dictatorial government.
178
 
Mussolini and the Church both got what they wanted.
179
 Italy’s treaty with the Church legitimized 
Mussolini and Fascism at home and abroad and enabled consolidation of their already considerable 
power.
180
 For the Church, the Lateran Pacts undid the liberal reforms protecting institutional and 
individual religious liberty, reconfessionalizing Italy as an exclusively Catholic state and subjecting 
non-Catholic religions to discriminatory burdens.
181
 The Pacts also initiated a de facto alliance with 
Fascism that lasted from 1929 through at least the fall of Mussolini’s first government in 1943.182 
There is little doubt that Pope Pius XI (1922-39) welcomed Fascism as an ally in the Church’s fight 
against democracy, liberalism, pluralism, socialism, and communism.
183
  
The relationship between Fascism and the Church deepened with the election of Pius XI’s 
successor, Pius XII (1939-58). Pius XII not only shared his predecessor’s view of Fascism as a 
bulwark against the Church’s contemporary political and social enemies,184 he was more cautious 
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 Id. 
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Nazi excesses. See Gianni LONG, ALLE ORIGINI DEL PLURALISMO CONFESSIONALE: IL DIBATTITO SULLA LIBERTÀ RELIGIOSA 
NELL’ETÀ DELLA COSTITUENTE 212-13 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990). 
184
 See BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI’S ITALY, supra note 155, at 348. 
Cross, crucifix, culture: an approach to the constitutional meaning of confessional symbols 
25 
about criticizing the regime and less reticent about cooperating with it.
185
 Pius XII’s family, 
additionally, had close ties to the Bank of Rome, which was a crucial source of Fascist financing.
186
 
As we discuss in more detail below,
187
 Pius XII is a figure of great controversy. Professor 
Bosworth’s measured assessment of his attitudes observes that 
there has been an absurd and lengthy debate whether or not Pius XII was “Hitler’s pope,” a warrior 
who de facto served the German side of the conflict. Of course he did not. The Church authorities 
judged Nazism before and after 1939 an ungodly movement. It is fairer, however, to see Pius and 
the hierarchy over whom he presided as fellow travelers or outright sympathizers with Mussolini 
and Fascism. In what they perceived as this wicked world, the Vatican liked most of what they 
saw in Fascism and . . . preferred it probably to liberal democracy and certainly to socialism and 
communism. All in all, the Church’s wartime stance towards the dictatorship was not very 
different from that prevailing among [Italian] businessmen and landowners, who thought that 
Fascism, despite its eccentricities, was fine for them until it became obvious that it was going to 
lose its battles on every front.
188
 
d. Fascist-Era Anti-Semitism 
It is not true, as Italians sometimes suggest,
189
 that anti-Semitism was largely unknown in pre-war 
Italy.
190
 Hostility to Jews is deeply rooted in Italian and Catholic history (as in other religions and 
elsewhere in the West).
191
 Jews in the Papal States were subjected to the Inquisition, and humiliations 
and disabilities imposed on them as late as the 19
th
 century bore a disquieting resemblance to those 
instituted by the Nazis in advance of the Holocaust.
192
 For centuries the Church had taught that the 
burdens borne by Jews in Europe were the natural and deserved consequence of their having rejected 
the true Savior and his New Testament.
193
  
By the pre-war era, Catholic teaching distinguished acceptable “discrimination” against Jews from 
their unacceptable “persecution.” The Church condemned anti-Jewish violence, but generally 
(Contd.)                                                                  
 [T]he elevation of Pius XII was welcomed among the Fascist leadership, as it should have been, given the new Pope’s 
family background in Italian high finance, fervent anti-communism and preference for Fascism over other modern 
ideologies which kept in thrall a sinful mankind. Despite further jars with Mussolini, in his occupation of the papal chair 
Pius XII heralded no rupture in the cohabitation between Church and State in Fascist Italy. 
 Id. 
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supported discriminatory legislation that sought to restrict Jewish influence on Catholic society, at 
least in Italy.
194
 Having rejected the Christian revelation, Jews were viewed as a continuing threat to 
properly constituted Christian societies, and thus could be treated as second-class citizens.
195
 Pre-war 
popes also reflexively associated Jews with communism, liberalism, modernism, socialism, and other 
enemies of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century Church.
196
  
Catholic teaching, however, understood Judaism as a religion and a culture, not as a supposed 
race.
197
 The Church viewed Jews who converted to Catholicism as no longer Jewish, and it 
consistently protested Fascist application of restrictive Jewish racial laws against Catholic converts
198
 
Fascist-era efforts to intervene on behalf of all Jews, however, were rare.
199
 For example, the Church 
never generally condemned Mussolini’s 1938 anti-Jewish racial laws, except as they affected Jewish 
converts to Catholicism and Jews married to Catholics.
200
 Discrimination against observant Jews 
resonated with the Church’s belief that the practice of Judaism subverted of the Christian message and 
justified measures to reduce Jewish influence.
201
 
Whether the Fascist-era Popes—Pius XI and especially Pius XII—were unacceptably passive in the 
face of the Holocaust is a matter of enormous factual and ethical controversy. Their defenders argue 
that they acted courageously, doing the maximum that could have been done given the dire 
circumstances of the Church.
202
 Papal detractors, on the other hand, contend that defenses of the 
Fascist-era Popes are myths built on repetition and exaggeration encouraged by the Church.
203
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 The terrible truth is that [Pius XI and Pius XII] were not opposed to moderate measures separating Jews from Christian 
society. That attitude continued throughout the war and complicated every decision. With each week and month that 
passed it became more awkward and difficult to oppose measures that should have been denounced from the onset. 
 Id. 
202
 Professor Rychlak, argues that Pius XI and Pius XII both issued encyclicals and statements criticizing Fascism and 
Nazism and otherwise condemned anti-Semitism. See, e.g., RYCHLAK, supra note 198, at 23-41 passim, 91-93, 97, 112-
19, 124-28, 155; accord VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 174 (observing that Pius XII’s 1942 Christmas address “alluded 
in general terms to those who ‘solely because of their nation or their race, have been condemned to death or progressive 
extinction”). Professor Ventresca emphasizes elsewhere, however, that Pius XII avoided explicit condemnations of Nazi 
persecution of Jews. See, e.g., VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 177. 
 Once the war started, the Vatican as a sovereign country was obliged to maintain its neutrality by both international law 
and the threat of invasion and occupation by the Italian army and the German occupiers, with the attendant threat of arrest 
of the Pope himself. See ROMANO, supra note 155, at 91-92; RYCHLAK, supra note 198, at 17-18, 123-24, 133-36; 
VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 166-67; ZUCOTTI, supra note 194, at 206-07, 220, 315-16. Professor Ventresca, however, 
questions that any plan of occupation and arrest ever existed, though Pius XII and Vatican officials took the possibility 
seriously. VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 193-94. Short of actual invasion, Fascists or Nazis could have easily laid siege 
to the Vatican, cutting off food, fuel, power, and most contact with the outside world. Cf. ROMANO, supra note 155, at 88 
(describing the threatening and isolated circumstances of Pius XII during the Fascist era, especially after the German 
occupation in 1943). 
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We cannot resolve these controversies here.
204
 However, whatever Pius XI and XII, the Vatican, 
and the Church may or may not have done for Jews during the Fascist era, it cannot be gainsaid that 
(Contd.)                                                                  
 It is undeniable, finally, that thousands of courageous Catholic clerics in Italy—including the cardinal archbishops of 
Genoa, Florence, Milan, and Turin, and some Vatican clerics (perhaps including Pius himself)—ran great risks to hide 
and protect thousands of Jews from arrest, internment, and deportation under the German occupation; some paid with 
their lives. See, e.g., RYCHLAK, supra note 198, at 18, 101, 105; ZUCOTTI, supra note 194, at 87-88, 189-92, 199, 202-06, 
212-13, 233-64 passim. These efforts, it is suggested, were directed behind the scenes by Pius XII because he could not 
openly challenge the Fascists or the Nazis. See, e.g., RYCHLAK, supra note 198, at 7, 101-02, 130-33, 138, 255; see also 
VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 299, 307. While Jews undeniably fared poorly in Fascist and German-occupied Italy, it is 
suggested that an apparently greater percentage survived there than anywhere else in Europe: Of an estimated 40,000 to 
45,000 Jews residing in pre-war Italy, 7,500 to 8,000 were killed in Italy or deported to death camps in Germany and 
Poland, from which between 500 and 1,000 returned. See BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI’S ITALY, supra note 155, at 472; LONG, 
supra note 183, at 283. The proportion of Italian Jews who perished—substantially less than 20% of the pre-war 
population—is claimed to have been lower than in any other part of Germany or German-allied or -occupied Europe.  
203
 Pius XI’s encyclicals, for example, did not condemn Fascism or Nazism as such, but only for their offenses against the 
Church See LONG, supra note 183, at 213; VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 117, 126-27. As we indicated above, neither 
pope was fundamentally opposed to discriminatory measures designed to safeguard Christian society against what they 
viewed as disproportionate Jewish influence, see supra notes 194-96 & accompanying text, and they and other Church 
leaders welcomed Fascism as an ally against the Church’s many 20th century enemies, see supra notes 183-88 & 
accompanying text. 
 No written evidence or first-hand account has ever emerged of a general directive by Pius XII that Vatican officials and 
Catholic orders and clerics assist Jewish fugitives at any time during the Fascist era, even in Italy or strongly Catholic 
countries where the Church enjoyed grassroots influence; It is argued that this suggests that no such directive was ever 
issued. See, e.g., VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 308; ZUCOTTI, supra note 194, at 101, 114-15, 192, 180, 236, 238, 243, 
245, 253, 258-59, 263-64, 281. Contra RYCHLAK, supra note 198, at 207-25 (maintaining that direct evidence of general 
papal orders to protect Jews has been overlooked or ignored). No general public condemnation of Fascist or Nazi anti-
Semitism was issued even after the possibility of Axis occupation or siege was eliminated by the Allied liberation of 
Rome (June 4, 1944) or, indeed, the end of the war itself (May 6, 1945). VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 177, 219, 229, 
310; ZUCOTTI, supra note 194, at 283. Contra RYCHLAK, supra note 198, at 141. 
 While many clerics courageously hid and protected Jews during the German occupation, see supra note 202, most did 
not. See, e.g., ZUCOTTI, supra note 194, at 201 (noting that of the 1,272 Catholic orders and institutions and additional 
“hundreds of parish churches” operating in Rome during the German occupation, only 155 are claimed by the Vatican to 
have sheltered Jews); see also RYCHLAK, supra note 198, at 101 (noting that 150 Church buildings in Rome sheltered 
Jews and other victims of the German occupation); VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 230 (same regarding 180 Catholic 
institutions). Many Italian clerics embraced even the extreme anti-Semitic measures imposed during the German 
occupation, ROMANO, supra note 155, at 93-95; ZUCOTTI, supra note 194, at 258, 268-73, and the Vatican itself was 
conflicted about its own sheltering of Jews and the appropriateness of such aid by other Italian clerics, see ZUCOTTI, 
supra note 194, at 45-46, 206-10, 192, 195, 219-31, 256-58, 281-85. Interventions by Pius XII and other Vatican 
officials, it is argued, were generally cautious, vague, polite, and amazingly few; they were usually put forward only on 
behalf of Jewish converts to Catholicism and Jews married to Catholics, rather than for all Jews, and were rarely decisive 
in the actual rescue of Jews. See, e.g., VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 147, 177-80, 189; ZUCOTTI, supra note 194, at 3, 
50-51, 64-69, 78, 101-46 passim, 218-19, 272-73, 292. Professor Zucotti praises the Vatican for eventual efforts on 
behalf of Jews facing deportation from Italian occupation zones in Croatia and southeastern France, and from Hungary, 
ZUCOTTI, supra note 194, at 125-26, 129-31, 293-94, while Professor Rychlak maintains that such papal interventions 
were common and effective throughout Europe during the war, see RYCHLAK, supra note 198, at 207-25. 
 Finally, however one presents the numbers, by the end of the war Italian Jews had been reduced to less than half of their 
prewar population by immigration, “defensive” conversion to Catholicism, and deportation to death camps. See LONG, 
supra note 183, at 283 (reporting that approximately one-third of Jews in pre-war Italy immigrated or converted to 
Catholicism to avoid racial restrictions, internment, execution, or deportation; 7,500 were executed or deported to death 
camps, of whom 610 survived, leaving about 20,000 Jews in post-war Italy out of a pre-war population of 40,000 to 
45,000). 
204
 Professor Ventura offers this nuanced assessment of Papal and Church conduct with respect to Italian Jews during the 
war: 
 From 1938 to 1945, Italian racial laws under the alliance between Italian fascism and German Nazis exerted a heavy toll 
on Italian Jewish communities, in particular in Rome. The debate is still open on the responsibilities of individual 
Catholics and of the Catholic Church as a whole. While experts have exposed the heavy involvement of Italian Catholics 
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their greatest focus was on protecting Catholic interests—aligning the Church with Fascist Italy to 
obtain recognition of its temporal sovereignty, reconfessionalize Italy, and obtain reparations for loss 
of the Papal States; negotiating a concordat with the Nazi regime to protect the Church’s members and 
interests in Germany; tailoring its pronouncements and actions during the war to safeguard Vatican 
neutrality and forestall occupation or siege; and intervening mostly on behalf of Jewish converts and 
Jews in mixed marriages rather than for Jews in general.
205
 When these interests conflicted with the 
protection of Jews, even Italian Jews, the popes, the Vatican, and the Church usually favored their own 
interests over those of the Jews, though some Italian and Vatican clerics individually (and heroically) 
chose differently.
206
 This prioritization of the Church’s interests and constituencies when confronted 
with Fascism and Nazism undercuts the claim that the crucifix as quintessential sign of Catholicism is 
sensibly viewed as a mere secular symbol of Italian history and culture or the constitutional protection 
of all Italians.
207
  
e. Catholic Confessional Republic 
Post-war Italy chose liberal democracy in a 1946 referendum,
208
 but Pius XII and the Church proved to 
be insurmountable obstacles to implementation of Italy’s liberal-democratic Constitution. Jews, 
Protestants, and every other non-Catholic religion, along with the secular left of social democrats, 
socialists, and communists, endorsed a nonconfessional state with individual and institutional religious 
equality, as was indeed provided by the text of the proposed Constitution.
209
 This would have 
necessitated repudiation or substantial amendment of the Fascist-era Lateran Pacts, which privileged 
the Church and severely constrained the religiousl liberty of non-Catholic individuals and 
institutions.
210
 
Non-Catholic endorsement of religious equality drew a rebuke from Pius XII, who publically 
accused Jews and Protestants of conspiring with leftist unbelievers to deprive the Church of its 
rightful, preeminent place in Italy, invoking the traditional teaching that constitutional protection was 
appropriate only for religious truth, meaning only for the Church and its teachings.
211
 
(Contd.)                                                                  
in the anti-Jewish persecution, the dominant narrative in the media is that the diplomatic wariness of the Holy See was 
inevitable, and that eventually Catholic institutions proved friendly to the Jewish people. 
 Ventura, supra note 89, ¶ 19, at 28; see also id., ¶ 61, at 44 (“Confronted with anti-Semitism leading to deportations to 
concentration camps and to the holocaust, Catholics split: some of them did their best to protect threatened Jewish 
people, but many others concurred in the persecutions through omission or connivance.”). 
205
 See ZUCOTTI, supra note 194, at 323 (describing Vatican officials’ “narrow focus on their own Catholic constituency” 
during the Fascist era, and their view that the Vatican was obliged to “concentrate its resources and energies on the 
Catholic faithful, so threatened by the modern world”); VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 177, 178 (Pius XII “shared the 
conventional view that Jewish questions were not the primary concern of the church. [As secretary of state], the future 
Pius XII did not believe he had the authority, or the responsibility, to defend the civil rights of German Jews as 
vigorously as he defended German Catholics.”); Ventura, supra note 89, ¶ 61, at 44 n.86 (noting historian Giovanni 
Miccoli’s conclusion that during the Fascist era neither the Catholic Church nor Christian churches generally viewed 
protecting Jews, even from deportation and extermination, as a pressing concern). 
206
 This is one of Zucotti’s primary claims. See, e.g., ZUCOTTI, supra note 194, at 48-54, 69, 87-89, 189-92, 199-204, 218-20, 
235-37, 244-45, 252-53, 257-61; accord VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 78-86, 92, 99-103, 146-47, 189-92, 221. 
207
 See, e.g., ZUCOTTI, supra note 194, at 69 (Until the papacy of John XXIII, “it was not considered self-evident that the 
Catholic Church should champion the rights of those outside its fold.”) (internal quotation marks deleted); see also Calo, 
supra note 161, at 3-4 (noting Church’s transformation since mid-19th century from staunch opponent to powerful 
defender of liberal-democratic rights and values). 
208
 Ventura, supra note 89, ¶ 64, at 45. 
209
 See Pin, supra note 11, at 114.Ventura, supra note 89, ¶ 65, at 45. 
210
 E.g., A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTÀ RELIGIOSA, supra note 161 at 44; LONG, supra note 183, at 236, 288-89, 293-98. 
211
 LONG, supra note 183, at 214, 217-20. 
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Pius thus insisted on constitutionalization of the Pacts without alteration, despite their flat 
contradiction of religious liberty and equality guarantees in the proposed Constitution.
212
 As Professor 
Alessandro Ferrari has observed, the Church again, as it did in first negotiating the Pacts, placed 
protection of its own confessional interests over general provisions that would have equally protected 
the religious liberty of all.
213
 
The secular left eventually compromised by agreeing to include the Pacts in the Constitution, on 
the understanding that the Church and the new Italian republic would renegotiate their provisions in 
due course to bring them into harmony with the Constitution.
214
 This not only left the Church 
entrenched in its traditional position of power and privilege,
215
 it also left intact the odious Fascist-era 
requirement that non-Catholic religions obtain express state permission before they could legally 
operate in Italy as religions.
216
 
During what has become known as the “First Republic,” the Church strongly influenced Italian 
politics and government through its ally, the Christian Democratic Party or “DC.”217 Although not a 
confessional party, the DC was subject to Papal influence, as evidenced by its formation of early 
coalition governments with post-war monarchists and fascists to avoid sharing power with the 
Church’s liberal, social democratic, and communist enemies,218 its post-war policy of channeling 
national tax dollars to the reconstruction of Catholic cathedrals destroyed in the war, but not 
synagogues or Protestant churches,
219
 and its determined opposition to liberal reforms opposed by the 
Church, such as civil divorce and abortion (legalized over papal and DC opposition only in the early 
1970s and late 1980s, respectively).
220
  
The renegotiation of the Lateran Pacts was not concluded until the Villa Madama Accords in 
1984—almost 40 years after ratification of the liberal-democratic Constitution and 20 years after the 
Second Vatican Council belatedly endorsed freedom of religious belief and worship as fundamental 
personal and group rights.
221
 The Accords eliminated the Church’s status as the state church of Italy, 
                                                     
212
 LONG, supra note 183, at 215-16; 236; see also Ventura, supra note 89, ¶ 66, at 46. 
 [The] Constitution [of 1948] was not the Constitution of a Catholic State. This could not be the Catholic State of the 
Ancien Regime tradition, nor of the age of liberalism; nor of course could it be a Catholic State in the Fascist sense. 
Catholic Italy was still there, socially and politically, and to some extent legally, but Italy was now framed with a 
Constitution based on pluralism, freedom, and equality. 
 Id. 
213
 A. Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy, supra note 158, at 848. 
214
 A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTÀ RELIGIOSA, supra note 161, at 44, 45; LONG, supra note 183, at 318-19; see Ventura, supra note 
89, ¶ 66, at 46. 
215
 A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTÀ RELIGIOSA, supra note 161, at 57. 
216
 A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTÀ RELIGIOSA, supra note 161, at 54; LONG, supra note 183, at 281-82; Pin, supra note 11, at 119. 
217
 A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTÀ RELIGIOSA, supra note 161, at 44; A. Ferrari, supra note 158, at 845; Pin, supra note 11, at 137; 
Ventura, supra note 89, ¶ 67, at 46. 
218
 VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 238, 245-49; see FRANCESCO BARBAGALLO, L’ITALIA REPUBBLICANA 15 (Rome: Carocci, 
2009) (observing that even in the late 1940s the Church remained aligned with the “authoritarianism of the right and 
struggled to adjust to political democracy”) (authors’ translation); LONG, supra note 158, at 224 (observing that the 
Church was fervently condemning liberalism as late as 1946); VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 243-45 (recounting Pius’s 
sympathy for Italian monarchists and his hostility to the left, including authorization of excommunication for any 
Catholic member of the Italian Communist Party). 
 The DC often resisted papal overtures, making clear that it was a “center-left” party “open to the right.” See, e.g., 
VENTRESCA, supra note 185, at 238, 245. 
219
 LONG, supra note 183, at 293. 
220
 A. FERRARI, LA LIBERTÀ RELIGIOSA, supra note 161, at 59, 60-61. 
221
 Ventura, supra note 89, ¶ 69, at 48. 
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along with some of its related privileges, though they permit Catholic teaching in public schools for 
students who desire it, and expressly note that Catholicism is part of the “historical legacy” of the 
Italian people.
222
 Only after Villa Madama did Italy ratify long-negotiated agreements that legally 
recognized Jewish and Protestant communities.
223
 Similar agreements with less familiar groups such 
as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) had to 
await the fall of the DC in 1992.  
f. Universal Protector of Human Rights 
After the deconfessionalization of Italy and the demise of the DC, the Church struggled to find a new 
political identity. Building on the postwar myth that the Church had saved Italy from totalitarian 
disasters on the right and the left,
224
 on Vatican II’s recognition of universal religious liberty,225 and 
finally on Villa Madama’s express recognition of Catholicism as an Italian historical-cultural legacy,
 
226
 the Church reconceptualized itself as a universal “human-dignity umbrella” which sheltered all 
people in the exercise of the freedom of religion and belief, regardless of the character of that belief or, 
indeed, unbelief. This enabled a presentation of the Church as the guardian and protector of human 
rights for all Italians and, indeed, all of humankind.
227 
This reasoning is evident in the Italian court 
opinions in Lautsi which contend that the crucifix is a secular signifier of liberal-democratic values 
and the historic relationship of the Italian people with Christianity.
228
 
* * * 
Within the last two centuries, therefore, the Church whose beliefs are ordinarily signified by the 
crucifix has 
a) Ruled central Italy as an absolute monarch; 
b) Bitterly fought the unification and modernization of Italy under a liberal constitutional 
monarchy; 
c) Successfully overturned religious egalitarian reforms and restored Catholicism as the 
privileged state religion by aligning itself with Fascism through the Lateran Pacts; 
d) Officially navigated the shoals of the Fascist era by prioritizing Catholic interests over those 
of Italian and other European Jews, though some of its clerics chose to protect and rescue 
Jews from Fascist and Nazi threats;  
e) Blocked the establishment of a religiously impartial liberal-democratic state for almost 40 
years after the fall of Fascism, contrary to express constitutional guarantees and the 
unanimous opposition of non-Catholics and the secular left; and finally, 
f) Fashioned only in the last generation an identity as protector of religious liberty and other 
human rights for all Italians and all people. 
It seems unlikely that Church teachings and practices of barely 30 years duration have displaced 
centuries in which the Church subordinated unbelievers and non-Catholics to its own priorities and 
(Contd.)                                                                  
 Italian courts had begun to undermine the Lateran Pacts in the 1970s. See Ventura, supra note 89, ¶ 69, at 47. An 
increasingly liberal electorate foreshadowed that change was inevitable. Id., at 48. 
222
 Pin, supra note 11, at 118;Ventura, supra note 89, ¶71, at 49. 
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 Ventura, supra note 89, ¶71, at 49. 
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 See A. Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy, supra note 158, at 847-48. 
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 See Calo, supra note 161, at 21-24. John Paul II, the pope who oversaw the deconfessionalization of Italy under the Villa 
Madama Accords, was also the pope who made human rights a central concern of the Church. Id. at 24. 
226
 See, e.g., A. Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy, supra note 158, at 851; Pin, supra note 11, at 121. 
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 See Calo, supra note 161, at 3,4. 
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 See supra Parts II-B-2-a & -b. 
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interests.
229
 But if the relatively brief periods in which the Church has recognized personal religious 
freedom (about a half century) and renounced its claims to preeminent status as the state religion of 
Italy (about a quarter century) have indeed served to displace the ordinary Catholic meaning of the 
crucifix, one would find confirmation in contemporary Italian culture. One would see non-Catholic 
and unbelieving Italians, as well as human rights and other secular activist groups, using the crucifix 
as a secular sign of freedom of religion, laicità’s guarantee of state religious even-handedness, and 
secular human rights for all humankind. 
Unsurprisingly, non-Catholic and unbelieving use of the crucifix is unknown in contemporary 
Italian culture. Neither Jews nor Protestants nor Muslims, nor secular human rights organizations, nor 
anyone other than the Church and its practicing Italian members uses the crucifix as a secular symbol. 
Even some practicing Catholics are skeptical.
230
 Italian cultural usage—or, rather, lack thereof—
confirms that the crucifix has not acquired any secular meaning that is independent of its ordinary 
Catholic confessional meaning.  
III. Cross, Crucifix, and Culturation 
The decisions in Buono and Lautsi each rest on two premises. First, they expressly acknowledge that 
the cross and the crucifix each ordinarily have confessional meaning.
231
 And second, they implicitly 
assume that the State’s adopting or endorsing this religious or confessional meaning would be 
unconstitutional, as is evident from Buono’s assertion of an extraordinary secular meaning for the 
cross when displayed at veterans memorials,
232
 the Italian courts’ assertion of extraordinary meanings 
for the crucifix when displayed in public school classrooms,
233
 and Lautsi’s remarkable assertion that 
the crucifix has no confessional meaning or effect at all in an Italian public school.
234
 These premises 
are evident in each decision’s assertion of an extraordinary meaning for each symbol: honor and 
memory of all military dead, in case of Buono and the cross, and the Christian-Catholic roots of 
universal human rights and Italian culture (to which the ECtHR deferred), in case of Lautsi and the 
crucifix. These alternate secular meanings are not obvious from their ordinary confessional 
counterparts, and actually seem to be at odds with them since they subvert or deny the symbol’s 
theological significance. Of course, if the confessional meanings were not constitutionally 
problematic, there would have been no need to substitute the less obvious secular meanings adopted 
by the USSCt and the Italian courts, or to deny confessional meaning altogether, as did the ECtHR. 
Buono and Lautsi defend the alternate secular meanings for the cross and the crucifix in two ways. 
First, they deemphasize the ordinary religious or confessional meaning of the symbols; because such 
meanings undermine the plausibility of any alternate secular meaning, a court that intends to uphold 
the symbol gains nothing by emphasizing its confessional content. And second, they erase the effect of 
the cross and the crucifix. Buono does this by suggesting that there is no Establishment Clause harm—
that is, no legally cognizable “endorsement” effect—if the symbol conveys a secular message.235 
Lautsi accomplishes the same thing more directly, emphasizing the crucifix’s “passivity” and the lack 
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 Cf. Beamon, supra note 10, at 96 (noting the dubious historical assumption that all Italians—not just Italian Catholics—
have experienced Catholicism as an unqualified good that has not infringed religious or other freedoms); A. Ferrari, Civil 
Religion in Italy, supra note 158, at 841 (suggesting that rather than a unifying civil religion Italy has had “a church-
religion, aiming to establish a ‘protected democracy’ . . . subordinated to the objectives and non-negotiable values of a 
single church”). 
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 See, e.g., A. Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy, supra note 158, at 841. 
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 See supra Parts II-A-1 & -B-1. 
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 See supra Part II-A-2. 
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 See supra Part II-B-2-c. 
235
 See supra Part II-A-2. 
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of any evidence that non-Catholic children were treated badly or differently in Italian classrooms 
where the crucifix is displayed.
236
 
But merely positing a possible secular meaning for a confessional symbol is hardly decisive of the 
constitutional question: The government can nearly always articulate a possible secular meaning for 
the ordinarily confessional symbols that it uses. What matters is not the possibility of an alternate 
secular meaning, but its actual existence—not whether a secular meaning is imaginable, but whether it 
is present and recognizable in the history and culture of the society in which it is displayed.
237
 The 
meaning of a sign is in principle indeterminate, but it does not follow, as judges sometimes suppose,
 
238
 that a sign can mean anything.
239
 The meaning of a sign is specified by its overall context—not just 
the immediate context in which it is displayed (a veterans memorial, a public school classroom),
240
 but 
also the history and culture of the place where it is displayed (the United States, Italy).
241
 
As we have seen, the purported secular meanings asserted for the cross and the crucifix are 
culturally inauthentic. The cultural histories to which the courts appeal in their respective efforts to 
prove these secular meanings obscure a predominant confessional meaning, and one cannot find 
unbelievers or minority believers in either the United States or Italy who themselves use these symbols 
in a manner that would confirm the secular meanings that courts have projected onto them.
 242
 
The cross may be a commonly displayed cultural symbol in the U.S., and the crucifix such a 
symbol in Italy, but it does not follow that they are secular symbols. Rather, they are remnants of a 
Christian culture (Protestant in the U.S., Catholic in Italy) that in practice no longer exists as it once 
did. As sociological data makes clear, both cross and crucifix have become “deculturated,” alienated 
from the culture where they once enjoyed a natural and privileged place. As Professor Beaman has 
pointed out, deculturation explains the ironic self-presentation of traditional majoritarian religions as 
embattled cultural minorities.
243
 
In short, neither cross nor crucifix is any longer culturally at home as a confessional symbol. The 
United States is no longer a predominantly Protestant culture, and is fading as a seriously Christian 
one. Self-declared Protestants now constitute a bare majority of U.S. adults,
244
 and Christianity 
(especially evangelical Protestantism) has ceased to be a major American cultural influence.
245
 
NonChristians, unaffiliated believers, and unbelievers now constitute over a fifth of the population,
246
 
and have more than doubled in the just the last two decades. The trend is starker among young people: 
Only four in ten young adults ages 18 to 29 self-identify as Protestant, and one in four is either an 
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unbeliever or unaffiliated with a religion.
247
 Perhaps most telling, large majorities of Americans do not 
believe that their religion is the only way to heaven, or that there is significant conflict between belief 
and contemporary society.
248
 
Though Italy is among the more religious of the EU countries,
249
 its culture is also secularizing, as 
evidenced by large and growing gaps between Italian practice and Catholic teachings. Rates of 
Catholic baptisms, first communion, confirmation, and marriages have shown substantial declines in 
just the last 15 years.
250
 These data on so-called Catholic “rites of passage” are far more telling than 
those on attendance at mass (which, in any event, has also dropped precipitously over the last 
generation). Another clear indicator is the radically new understandings of “family” in Italian society: 
The data point to 
the emergence of a new family model in Italy, which is completely opposite to the one promoted 
by the Catholic Church. There are increasing numbers of couples without children, single parents, 
and divorced parents who remarry or choose to cohabit.
 
Family formation is changing and 
following the pattern of other advanced Western countries.
 251
  
An overwhelming majority of Italian Catholics opposes Church intervention in Italian politics,
 252
 and 
the result of most referenda relating to practices opposed by the Church has been rejection of the 
Catholic position.
253
 
In short, “a process of secularization is taking place in Italy that is slow, but continuous. The 
process of transformation is oriented towards a more flexible attitude in applying the Catholic precepts 
and sometimes a growing disinterest towards these precepts by the Italian people.”254  
Both the United States and Italy are confronted with increasing secularization and growing 
demands from believers, unbelievers, faith communities, and other groups that government take into 
account specific aspects of their belief or unbelief when it acts—especially when it adopts or displays 
symbols. A paradox is evident: On the one hand, there is a growing national “identitarian” narrative, 
focused on a presupposed confessional identity or affiliation of the people, while on the other, 
statistical data confirm the steady secularizing of individual behavior and the widening gulf between 
religion and popular culture. The triumphant “return of religion” has not in reality been confirmed by 
empirical data on religious practice and belief. 
As Professor Roy has shown, “religion” is now less a faith than a cultural phenomenon.255 We see 
this in both Buono and Lautsi. The confessional elements of both cross and crucifix are losing their 
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cultural salience—it can no longer be assumed, in other words, that the confessional referent of each 
sign is uniformly or even widely accepted and approved by Americans and Italians. As a consequence, 
the government could not defend its use of cross or crucifix on the basis of its confessional meaning. 
Defenses of each symbol sought instead to “re-acculturate” it, by turning it into a secular symbol 
which is at home in the secularizing cultures of the U.S. and Italy. 
The importance of careful cultural analysis is well illustrated by Professor Weiler’s argument 
before the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber on behalf of eight intervening countries in Lautsi & Others,256 
widely credited with persuading the Grand Chamber to overturn the prior Second Section decision 
invalidating classroom display of the crucifix.
257
 Like the Italian lower courts, Weiler spent most of his 
argument talking about religious symbols other than the crucifix. He noted the wide range of practices 
with respect to government use of religious language and symbols in Europe—established churches, 
constitutional invocations of the Trinity, crosses on national flags—the last especially powerful 
because national flags are simultaneously object and source of nationhood.
258
 He argued for a kind of 
group pluralism—a plurality of responses among nations, thus inviting the Court’s application of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine,
259
 and ignoring the powerful constitutional convergence trends 
documented by Professors Annichino, Ferrari, and Haupt, among others.
260
 
Within each “non-laïque” state he represented (which notably did not include a single 
predominantly Protestant nation), Weiler argued, “the continued entanglement of religious symbols in 
its public square and by the State is accepted by the secular population as a part of national identity 
and as an act of tolerance towards their co-nationals,” this latter presumably a reference to those 
practicing the historically dominant Roman Catholicism or Christian Orthodoxy in such countries.
261
 
There is no doubt that crosses on national flags have authentic—and by now close to exclusive—
nonconfessional, secular meaning. Unbelieving and non-Christian Norwegians and Finns and English 
who trek to the World Cup or the Olympics seem not to have have any qualms about waving the 
symbol of their country—cross and all—in support of national teams and athletes. Like the Christmas 
tree, crosses on national flags are symbols whose ordinary confessional meaning has long since been 
displaced by an alternate secular one, easily confirmed by this ubiquitous use by unbelievers and non-
Christians. 
But has the crucifix achieved this status? Weiler doesn’t say, and offers no evidence that it has. He 
argues that the “message of tolerance towards the Other” properly written into the European 
Convention “should not be translated into a message of intolerance towards one’s own identity,” 
suggesting that removing crucifixes from public school classrooms would have precisely that effect 
for Italians.
262
 But of whose identity did he speak? Which Italians? Baptist, Buddhist, Jehovah’s 
Witness, Jewish, Mormon, Muslim, and other non-Catholic and unbelieving Italians, of whom there 
are ever increasing numbers? Unless there is an alternate nonconfessional meaning for the crucifix that 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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is authentically present and genuinely recognized in Italian culture, the “lost identity” of which Weiler 
so passionately spoke is not that of the Italian people, but that of Italian Catholics and their Church.
263
 
In a narrow sense Weiler’s efforts in Lautsi and similar arguments in Buono were successful: The 
memorial cross was allowed to stay (for the present) in Buono, as was the classroom crucifix in Lautsi, 
so “religion” lives on for another day in the public square. But there is no actual U.S. culture, no real 
society, in which the cross possesses the secular meanings attributed to it by the USSCt. Nor is there 
any actual Italian culture, or real society, in which classroom display of the crucifix reflects the open 
and welcoming nonconfessional “tradition” of which the Italian courts spoke and to which the Grand 
Chamber deferred under the margin of appreciation. 
Similar arguments can be made against the position taken by Professor Cardia, who served as a 
consultant to the Italian government in preparing the Italian government’s submission to the Grand 
Chamber.
264
 Like the Italian courts, Cardia dubiously concludes (commenting on the Second Section 
decision), “[T]he symbol of the cross”—as in the Italian courts the crucifix seems to disappear in 
Weiler’s argument—“does not belong to one church or another: It belongs to Christianity, to the faith 
of each of us, even to the heart of one who, lacking other faiths, recognizes its universal meaning.”265 
A pretense of “reacculturation” is at work here, a shallow trivialization and stereotyping of 
formerly powerful religious narratives symbolized by the cross and the crucifix, effected by attributing 
nonconfessional meaning to obviously confessional symbols and embedding that meaning in a 
nonexistent, imaginary “culture” so as to create the illusion of acculturation. 
Part of the impulse to this “synthetic” re-acculturation is understandably strategic: By attributing 
secular meaning to religious symbols, confessional groups and their advocates show courts how to 
defend government use of these symbols, and thus also to preserve an apparent union of religion and 
national culture.
266
 But these efforts also betray a kind of cultural schizophrenia: Many believers—and 
especially the leaders of conservative Christian confessions—rail against the secularization of culture 
and its subversion of belief, yet they insist that their symbols and the confessional beliefs they signify 
are still at home in this ever more secular and unbelieving culture. But these symbols continue to fit, if 
at all, only as something other than the confessional symbols they are—hence the redefinition of such 
symbols as secular even and especially by the religions that use them and with which they have 
traditionally been associated. 
Most ironic is the likelihood that judicial re-definition of religious symbols as secular will actually 
accelerate and entrench the secularization that traditionally dominant religions deplore.
267
. As 
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Professor Roy has concluded, the challenge is not a “clash between different cultures, it is a separation 
of culture and religion.”268  
Conclusion: Acculturation or Witness? 
James Davison Hunter has argued that 
 [t]he goal for Christians . . . is not and never has been to “take back the culture” or to “take over 
the culture” or to “win the culture wars” or to “save Western civilization.” Ours is now, 
emphatically, a post-Christian culture, and the community of Christian believers are now, more 
than ever—spiritually speaking—exiles in a land of exile. Christians, as with the Israelites in 
Jeremiah’s account, must come to terms with this exile.
269
 
The temptation to dominate and politicize culture, Hunter continues, transforms “Christian public 
witness into the opposite of the witness Christianity is supposed to offer.”270 
Creating disingenuous accounts of imaginary history and inventing secular meanings that have no 
cultural existence do not serve as Christian witness, but as ironic and cynical manipulation. Conceding 
and cooperating with government in the desacralizing of sacred symbols will only dilute the authentic 
testimony of religions and believers who are already estranged from Western culture. In this respect, 
Buono and Lautsi are anything but good news for belief. 
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Appendices: English Translations of Italian Administrative Trial and Appellate Court Decisions 
in Lautsi 
I. Appendix I: Sentenza N. 1110/2005, Ric. N. 2007/02 (Tribunale Amministrativo 
Regionale Veneto - Sezione III Mar. 17, 2005)* 
 
REPUBLIC OF ITALY 
IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE 
The Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Veneto,
271
 Third Panel . . . has pronounced the 
following 
JUDGMENT 
on complaint n. 2007/02, brought by Soile Tuulikki Lautsi, for herself and as parent of minor children 
Dataico Albertin e Sami Albertin . . ., 
against 
the Ministry of Instruction, Universities, and Research, in the person of the minister pro tempore . . ., 
with the intervention as interested opposing parties 
of the Associazione “Forum” . . .; 
and of Mr. Paolo Bonato for himself and as parent of minor child Laura Bonato, and of Mr. Linicio 
Bano, in his capacity as president of the A.GE. (Italian Parents Association) of Padova . . .; 
for reversal 
of the decision handed down on 27 May 2002 by the Consiglio di Istituto of the Istituto Comprensivo 
“Vittorino da Feltre” of Abano Terme (Padova)—memorandum n. 5—to the extent that it decided to 
leave religious symbols displayed in the educational environment. 
. . . 
[C]onsidered in fact and law as follows: 
FACTS 
Massimo Albertin and Soile Tuulikki Lautsi, the latter born in the city of Sipoo, Finland, are the 
parents of Dataico and Sami Albertin, born in 1988 and 1990, respectively, and enrolled in 2002 in the 
Third and First Classes, respectively, of the istituto comprensivo statale “Vittorino da Feltre” of 
Abano Terme (Padova). 
On April 22, 2002, in the course of a meeting of the consiglio d’istituto-as can be read in the 
minutes of the meeting—the same Massimo Albertin, “in reference to the display of religious 
symbols” within the school, proposed their removal; after a thorough discussion, the decision was 
deferred to the meeting of May 27, when a resolution proposing “to leave religious symbols 
displayed” was put to a vote and approved. 
Soile Tuulikki Lautsi, for herself and as parent exercising custodial authority over her minor sons, 
has challenged this determination with the complaint under examination . . . . 
The complaint criticizes the challenged resolution, first of all, for violating the principles of 
impartiality and of the laicità of the State, and particularly the latter, as a supreme principle of the 
constitutional order, having absolute priority and fundamental character, inferable together from art. 3 
                                                     
 
*
 Translated by Frederick Mark Gedicks, Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law 
School, Provo, Utah & Dr. Pasquale Annicchino, Research Fellow, Robert Schumann Centre for Advanced Studies, 
European University Institute, Florence, Italy. 
 All footnotes have been added by the translators. Italics, asterisks, and typeface for English words mirror those in the 
original opinion. 
271
 The “Administrative Tribunal for the Veneto Region.” 
Frederick Mark Gedicks and Pasquale Annicchino 
38 
of the Constitution, which guarantees the equality of all citizens, and by the succeeding art. 19, which 
recognizes complete liberty to profess ones own religious faith, including even the profession of 
atheism or of agnosticism: A principle confirmed by art. 9 of the European Convention on Human 
rights, made effective in Italy with the law of 4 August 1955, n. 848, which recognizes the liberty to 
manifest “one’s own religion or creed.” 
The aforementioned principle of laicità, contiues the plaintiff, would preclude display of the 
crucifix and of other religious symbols in school classrooms, claimed to be in violation of the “parity 
that must be guaranteed to all religions and all beliefs, even those not religious.”: The challenged 
resolution of the Consiglio of the school “Vittorino da Feltre” would constitute an “open and clear 
violation of the aforementioned fundmental principles of out legal order.” 
Additionally, continues Ms. Lautsi, the same resolution would also be an illegitimate abuse of 
discretion by reason of its contradictory logic. 
One can presume, from what is written in the minutes of the meeting in which the provision was 
approved, that one of the members of the body had expressed a desire that “this problem might 
incentivize greater education about religious integration and respect for liberty of ideas and thought of 
all”: but, according to Ms. Lautsi, one cannot affirm this and at the same time deny it, “by deciding 
that in the school there must be present the religious symbol belonging, however, to a single 
determined religious confession.” 
. . . 
[The court then summarizes the defenses of the Ministry, noting that it contests the merits of the 
complaint and also raises procedural and jurisdictional objections by both parties, including the 
purported failure of the plaintiff to notify other parents and students in the school as interested 
opposing parties who might want to maintain display of the crucifix, the administrative law judge’s 
lack of jurisdiction over a matter involving personal constitutional rights, and the failure of the 
plaintiff to specifically reference the two regulations issued in 1924 and 1928 that actually control the 
case. It also noted the plaintff’s objection to the interventions of Associazione Forum, Mr. Bonato, and 
A.GE. 
The court then related the Tribunale’s previous referral of the case to the Corte Costituzionale, 
because it appeared to raise prima facie a question of constitutionality, and that court’s remanding of 
the case back to the Tribunale for lack of jurisdiction, explaining that the corte’s jurisdiction extends 
only to legislative acts, and not to administrative acts.] 
. . . 
As far as the merits are concerned, [the intervening parties] observe that the crucifix represents a 
symbol of Christian civilization and culture as a universal value, independent of a specific religious 
confession ; in any event, this would be a matter of a nondescriminatory sign. 
. . . 
As far as the merits are concerned, the complaining parties, also making use of the defense 
memoranda of the State Attorney’s Office filed in the constitutional office, relate how regulatory 
norms on the display of the crucifix, insofar as they are connected with Article 1 of the Statuto 
Albertino,
272
 have been at least implicitly abrogated by law n. 121 of 1985 containing modifications to 
the Concordat and of the succeeding norms that guarantee liberty of conscience.
273
 If the TAR were to 
consider the cited regulations as still enforceable, in her view they would in any event have to be 
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disallowed, insofar as they conflict with the constitutional principles of the nonconfessionalism of the 
state and of the liberty of conscience. 
After a full and through discussion held in the course of oral arguemnt on 17 March 2005, the case 
was prepared for decision.  
LAW 
[The court held that the Associazione Forum was not a proper intervening party, but that Mr. 
Bonato and the A.GE. were. It rejected all of the State’s procedural and jurisdictional objections.] 
. . . 
4.1. Preliminarily, this tribunal considers – with respect to the purpose of the present judgment and of 
an overall evaluation of the question – the cross and the crucifix to be equivalent symbols, as 
previously indicated in the decree of this TAR n. 56 of 2004 and also previously before by the 
Consiglio di Stato in advisory opinion n. 63 of 1988, even if it certainly did not ignore the differences 
between the two signs. In this respect, it must be remembered that the approach of the various 
Christian confessions with respect to the representation of Christ are very different; it is enough to 
think of the noted and varying positions on this point of the Catholic Church, of the Reformed and 
Orthodox churches, of the Waldensian [Valdese], Anglican, Old Order [Vetero] Catholic, Hussite, 
Copt, and Armenian churches. 
One must, however, be aware that in the prolonged praxis applying the regulation, as will be seen 
below, though it mentions only the crucifix, individual public schools often displayed a simple cross. 
Given that even in administrative law, it is conceivable that a custom could form as a source of 
unwritten law, a consistent behavior, repeated and constant for a certain number of years, is sufficient 
to complete the formation of an interpretive custom as part of the regulation. 
4.2. Additionally, the crucifix has always been held as a sign seen in a less absolute manner, insofar 
as it is considered fungible with other images of equivalent significance, in fact, circular n. 8823 of 
1923 of the Ministry of Public Instruction, admittedly in the context of a normative context also 
relating only to the crucifix, permitted (apparently to accommodate requests of the Waldensians) 
admitted the possibility that an image of Christ in another posture, for example, a scene showing Jesus 
with little children, could be substituted for the crucifix.  
In substance, acknowledging the customary (and thus also interpretive) application of the legal 
norms on the display of this symbol in the schools, the two objects – cross and crucifix – can be 
considered fully present within and interchangeable with each other. 
*** 
5.1. As far as concerns the reconstruction of the regulatory foundation of the challenged provision, it 
remains only to recall the repeated decree of this TAR n. 56 of 2004, which related how display of the 
crucifix in school classrooms is expressly prescribed by two legal norms, art. 118 of r.d. [royal decree] 
30 April 1924, n. 965 [hereinafter the “1924 decree”], containing direction on the internal order of 
institutes of middle school instruction, and art. 119 of r.d. 26 April 1928, n. 1297 [hereinafter the 
“1928 decree”] (and in particular in Table C attached to it), relating to institutes of elementary school 
instruction, norms that are historically connected to Article 140 r. d. n. 4336 of 1860, containing the 
implemented regulation of the well-known Casati law (l. n. 3725 of 1859), that included precisely the 
crucifix among the furnishings of school classrooms, later confirmed by regulation r. d. 6 February 
1908 n. 150 (attachment D relating to article 112). The two cited royal decrees of 1924 and 1928 
although dating back to the Statuto are still be in force, as confirmed by opinion 27 April 1988 n. 
63/1988, delivered by the Second Panel of the Consiglio di Stato and, although not expressly 
referenced in the act challenged here, established its legitimacy. 
5.2. In truth, continues order n. 56 of 2004, it is first of all recognized that the provisions referenced 
by the protesting Administration constitute as such a pertinent and adequate positive legal foundation 
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for the challenged provision, even though limited to a particular religious symbol, the crucifix, that is 
in any event the only one to which the complaint refers explicitly and with reasonable certainty, and to 
which the challenged provision refers. The cited [1928 decree] – included in Section XII entitled 
“School Rooms and Furnishings” – provides that every institute of middle school instruction “shall 
have the national flag; every classroom, the image of the crucifix and the portrait of the King”; the 
[1928 decree], in its turn, establishes that the various furnishings of school classrooms are listed in 
Table C, attached to the same regulation: and such listing includes the crucifix for each elementary 
school class. 
Such provisions having predated the Treaty and the Concordat between the Holy See and Italy – 
which was put into execution with the law of 27 May 1929, n. 810 – do not appear to be inconsistent 
with the provisions contained in the acts of the Lateran Pacts, in which nothing was established 
relative to the display of the crucifix in the schools or in any other public office; additionally, as the 
Consiglio di Stato relates in opinion n. 63/1988, the modifications brought to the Concordant with the 
[Villa Madama] Accords, and made effective with the law of 25 March 1985, n. 121, “not 
contemplating themselves in any way the material which we are discussing, so they cannot influence 
or condition the enforceability of the regulations relating to the original Concordat,” lacking the 
presuppositions of Article 15 of the norms of general law. 
In particular, continues the same opinion, neither a relationship of incompatibility of superseded 
norms nor the configuration of a new organization of the entire subject matter appears possible, their 
being already regulated by “preceding norms”: therefore, in conclusion, since the provisions under 
discussion “do not conform to the teaching of the Catholic religion nor do they constitute 
implementation of tasks assumed by the state under the Concordat, it must be held that these are even 
now legitimate.”  
5.3. The regulatory nature of the two cited regulations is deducible, first of all from specific 
provisions that qualify them as such (for example article 144 of [the 1924 decree], and the same 
heading of the [1928 decree]); one may add that their respective preambles reference acts of an 
indisputably legislative character – the testo unico of the laws on elementary school instruction, 
approved with the r. d. of 5 February 1928 n. 577, on the one hand, and the r.d. of 6 May 1923, n. 
1054, providing the directions for middle school instruction, on the other – which these decrees are 
dedicated to putting into detailed effect.  
5.4. For completeness, we related that in their turn, the cited laws were actually made effective in 
the formulation found at d. lgs. 16 April 1994, n. 297, through which was approved the testo unico of 
the legislative provisions in force in matters of instruction, relative to schools of every level and grade.  
In truth, the fact that according to the [1924 and 1928 decrees] (and in particular Table C attached 
thereto) the crucifix constitutes a school furnishing, is recalled by article 159, subsection I, of d. lgs. 
297/94, corresponding to article 55 of the r.d. of 5 February 1928, n. 577, which provides that it falls 
to the municipality to provide, among other things, “the funds necessary for the acquisition, the 
maintenance, and the refurbishing of teaching materials of scholastic furnishings comprised of the 
cabinets and shelving for school libraries, gym equipment, enrollment and printing supplies necessary 
for all elementary schools”; for the middle schools, then, article 190 of the cited d. lgs. 297/94, 
corresponding to article 103 of the r. d. of 6 May 1923, n. 1054, equally provides that the 
municipalities are obligated to furnish, beyond sufficient space, the furnishings, water, telephone, 
lighting, heating, and so on.  
There is, then, another provision, contained in the same d. lgs. 297/94 that must be considered, 
namely article 676, entitled “Abrogation norm,” which provides that “the provisions inserted in the 
present testo unico are in force in its resulting formulation; those not inserted remain dormant with the 
exception of those provisions contrary to or incompatible with the testo unico itself, which are 
abrogated.”  
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In truth, the norms contained in the [1924 and 1928 decrees] do not at all conflict with the testo 
unico and remained therefore fully enforceable by the same article 676.  
5.5. It serves then to consider that the nature of the regime that governed the Country during the era 
in which the cited regulations were issued and put into use,
274
 cannot at all entail their abrogation, both 
because this is an irrelevant legal consideration, as well as because, as noted, the norms assume a their 
own [proprio] meaning independent of the intentions of those who issued them.  
Additionally, as mentioned above, the norms governing display of the crucifix in school classrooms 
date back to 1859, when, among other things, there existed an historical context of vivid opposition 
between the Papacy and the unified State and, in any event, well before being instituted by the 
dictatorship. Evidently, display of the Christian symbol was considered at the time, along with display 
of the portrait of the King and of the flag, as a call to unifying values of the nation. 
Finally, the display of the crucifix in the schools has endured for such a long time, even after the 
fall of Fascism, that it is spoken of as a custom in the legal sense of the term.  
5.6. What we have been discussing, moreover, permits rejection of the thesis, argued on the part of 
the plaintiff in incorporated memoranda and sometimes referenced in jurisprudence and doctrine, 
according to which the two cited regulations (the [1924 and 1928 decrees]), insofar as they are strictly 
related to the Statuto Albertino and to its provision that Catholicism is the religion of the State (article 
1), would be abrogated by the republican Constitution or, at least, by the modification made to the 
Concordat by the Accord, ratified and made effective with the law of 25 March 1985 n. 121, that 
expressly expelled from the legal system the very concept of a religion of the State. 
First of all, the thesis relates that, not being a matter of express abrogation, it could be one of 
implied abrogation, from article 15 of the preleggi, which must be deduced from direct logical 
incompatibility, or else from the impossibility that the new norm and the old norm could coexist with 
respect to same object because of the absolute contradiction of the two provisions (Consiglio di Stato, 
Panel IV, 5 June 1995, n. 538). Nonetheless, this assumption implies the direct derivation of the 
regulation on display of the crucifix from article 1 of the Statuto Albertino, and thus its evident 
incompatibility both with the Constitution and with the modification of the Concordat of 1985; the 
thesis considers it demonstrated a p priori, however, that which constitutes instead the object of the 
present controversy—that is, the possible incompatibility of display of the crucifix in school 
classrooms with the actual constitutional arrangement.  
In truth, as already explicated above, the cited regulations have as a foundation the laws on public 
instruction and do not imply at all a direct application of the Statuto Albertino, which at the most can 
constitute only the reason for display of the crucifix but which do not impose it and certainly do not 
imply it as a logical consequence. In substance, the abrogation thesis, though striking, ignores the 
normative and historical picture and even more, takes for granted a single meaning of the symbol of 
the cross in the school context that is instead doubtful and controversial. Furthermore, it would be 
contradictory to simultaneously negate the direct derivation of the cited regulations from laws that 
regulate the equipment of the schools, concerning the same subject matter as the Corte Costituzionale 
established in the cited order of inadmissibility n. 389 of 2004, and at the same time place these 
regulations in direct correlation with article 1 of the Statuto Albertino, a norm with the force of 
ordinary law having a completely different object and goal.  
5.7. For completeness, it must be observed that it has also been held that the two regulations of 
1924 and 1928 did not provide the obligation to display the crucifix, but only the obligation of school 
administration to acquire it as part of the school equipment; the display would become in this manner 
optional and the choice in that regard would be transferred to each individual school, according to the 
will of the majority of the competent governing body.  
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This thesis does not appear tenable, first of all because of textual evidence, consisting of the [1924 
decree] – including chapter XII entitled “Of the Rooms and Furnishings of the Schools” – which 
provides that every institute of middle school instruction “shall have the national flag; every classroom 
the image of the Crucifix and the portrait of the King”; the [1928 decree] in its turn establishes that the 
furnishings of the various scholastic classes are listed in Table C attached to the same regulation: and 
such listing includes the crucifix for each elementary school class.  
The two cited norms, logically interpreted, make the display of the crucifix obligatory, also because 
it would not make any sense to equip the schools with an object lacking practical utility and a purely 
symbolic use without its display, say, if it were placed in a drawer. Finally, insofar as leaving the 
choice to each school, apart from the fact that the given legal norm does not permit it, it appears 
doubtful that in this subject matter, which involves individual liberties, it is up to majorities to decide. 
5.8. Another suggested thesis draws the legitimacy of the crucifix in school classrooms directly 
from article 7 of the Constitution that distinguishes the Catholic Church (the only one mentioned in the 
Charter) from the other religions, recognizing the Concordat regime and considering the Church an 
ally of the state under international law. It follows easily from this proposition that on the one hand, 
neither the crucifix, nor for more important reasons the cross, can today be identified only with the 
Catholic religion, and on the other hand, that the Lateran Pacts and the peculiar position of the 
Catholic Church in our legal order do not at all undermine – as will be seen in the following 
subsection 7.2. – the supreme principle of the laicità of the state and of the equality of the various 
religious confessions.  
5.9. In conclusion on this point, the court in its turn must recognize that the two acts in question 
have not been abrogated, neither expressly nor implicitly, by successive norms of a constitutional, 
legislative, or regulatory character. The [1924 and 1928 decrees] constitute, therefore, enforceable 
regulatory sources of law, as also asserted by the cited order of the Corte Costituzionale n. 389 of 
2004. 
*** 
6.1. The crucifix, as appears evident, cannot be considered simply as a furnishing, but is a symbol, an 
object that calls to mind diverse meanings with respect to its material attributes similar to a flag, a 
scepter, or a wedding ring.  
The question shifts therefore to what is to be the meaning or the meanings that this particular 
symbol evokes, to confirm, in the light of enforceable norms that are principally of constitutional 
character, if these are or are not compatible with its display in a public school. As is well known, the 
language of symbols constitutes a communicative system characterized by a high degree of vagueness 
and, at the same time, by the strong “emotional weight” of the indicated sign, for which both the 
preunderstanding of the interpreter as well as the contextualization of the examined symbol assume a 
relevant role.  
It is conceded that a symbol, especially the cross, assumes by its nature a polysemous content, even 
in a single historical moment, besides undergoing changes both in the course of time as well in relation 
to the context in which it is displayed. For example, the cross that stood out on the shields of the 
Templars presented a semantic meaning altogether different from the cross inserted into the logo of 
the French Gaullist party or that displayed on the hats of Red Cross workers.  
*** 
7.1. This court does not believe that it can be doubted that the constitutional value to which the 
cross refers is the laicità of the state, clearly sanctioned by the republican Constitution. Laicità or 
nonconfessionalism does not at all mean opposition to religion or religiosity, but more simply that the 
democratic state recognizes an independent value to the religious sphere as extraneous to the state’s 
power of decision; in substance, the State is proclaimed neutral with respect to the diverse religions to 
which the citizen may freely belong, or even not belong because of atheist convictions or simple 
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indifference with respect to the fact of religion. “Secular state” means, therefore, the recognition of an 
autonomous sphere in religious matters left to the free determination of the individual; it means also in 
our legal order the regulation of certain conditions of rapport with some specified religions 
(recognized to the extent that they are not placed in opposition to fundamental values of the republic) 
and, through the special Concordat regime, with the Catholic Church. “Secular state” means as well, 
as a logical corollary, that in the public school in which young people must be developed in 
accordance with values of liberty, democracy, and the laicità of the state, it is not legal to impose any 
type of religious creed and where, to the contrary, an education imprinted with maximal liberty and 
reciprocal respect in such matters is appropriate.  
7.2. In truth, as well explained in the cite order n. 56/04 of this TAR, the laicità of the Italian state 
constitutes, according to the judge of the laws,
275
 a supreme principle, emerging from articles 2, 3, 7, 
8, 19, and 20 of the Constitution and, therefore, “one of the contours of the form of the State 
delineated by the constitutional Charter of the republic,” (see Corte Costituzionale, 12 April 1989, n. 
203), and in which “faiths, cultures, and diverse traditions are to live together in equality of liberty” 
(Corte Costituzionale, 18 October 1995, n. 004). As an effect of the principle of laicità (successively 
affirmed by the Corte Costituzionale with the judgments nn. 259/90, 195/93 and 329/97), and, more 
specifically, of the equality of all citizens without distinction of religion (article 3 of the Constitution) 
and of the equal liberty before the law of all religious confessions (article 8 of the Constitution), “the 
attitude of the state cannot be other than one of equidistance and impartiality” towards each faith, 
“without giving any relevance to whether this or that religious confession has a large or a small 
number of adherents (judgment nn. 925 of 1988, 440 of 1995 and 329 of 1997)” (see Corte 
Costituzionale, 20 November 2000, n. 508). In such a context, believers and unbelievers are found 
“exactly on the same plane with respect to a prescribed intervention on the part of the state with 
respect to practices having religious meaning: it is excluded in any event—by reason of a religion’s 
belonging to a dimension that is not that of the state and of its legal order, which possesses only the 
task of guaranteeing conditions that favor expansion of the liberty of all and in this area, religious 
liberty.” (Corte Costituzionale, 8 October 1996, n. 334); while “different and differentiating legislative 
valuations and approvals” among the diverse faiths, with different degrees of protection, would 
infringe upon the equal dignity of the person and would be posed “in contradiction to the 
constitutional principle of the laicità or non-confessionalism of the State” (Corte Costituzionale, 14 
November 1997, n. 329). It is, finally, relevant that the numerous pronouncements of the Corte 
Costituzionale on this matter, if from one standpoint have concerned questions in which a specific 
prescription or normative imposition was discussed, nevertheless from the other they have affirmed a 
cardinal principle, that of the laicità of the State, that transcends individual legal events. 
7.3. For completeness, we recall also article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties, signed on November 4, 1950 and ratified with the law of 4 
August 1955 n. 848, which sets forth the inviolable right to “liberty of thought, conscience and 
religion.” 
In the view of this Court, this international norm—as with others of analogous tenor, such as the 
Convention of the Rights of the Child signed at New York on November 20, 1989 and ratified with the 
law of 27 May 1991 n. 176—does not add or take away anything from what is already clearly 
established by our Constitution with regard to the non-confessionalism of the State, but constitutes a 
mere confirmation of it. 
7.4. The laicità of the State, deriving directly from principles of equality and of liberty, constitutes 
not just a principle of the Italian legal order but also one in all western democratic systems; it is 
interesting to observe how the numerous jurisdictional pronouncements in various countries concerned 
with the legitimacy of the display of religious symbols in public spaces and in the schools, even in the 
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diversity of normative and social contexts, have always strongly affirmed the priority of the principle 
of the laicità of the State or of neutrality with respect to all religious faiths and atheist convictions, and 
this is true despite the most widely varying outcomes of the given judgments. 
The supreme principle of the non-confessionalism of the state has been considered in truth as a 
constant reference in the judgment of the Bundesberfassungsgericht of 16 May 1995, in that of the 
Constitutional Court of the Bavarian State of 1 August 1997, in the judgment of the Federal Tribunal 
of Switzerland of 26 September 1990, of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain of 12 June 1990, but also in 
numerous pronouncements of courts in the United States, even though pertaining to symbols different 
from the cross.  
7.5. The reference to jurisdictional decisions assumed in different legal orders compels the 
conclusion that the principle of the laicità of the State is by now part of the European legal heritage 
and of western democracies, but implies also that from its application in specific cases it is possible to 
draw diverse conclusions about the legality of the display of religious symbols in public places.  
7.6. It is added that other concepts, even reference in foreign pronouncements and collected in 
doctrine that has drawn wide comment, instead do not appear usable in the present controversy: for 
example the possibility of recalling the concept of positive (attiva) laicità, contrasted with a so-called 
passive laicità, appears doubtful, because this distinction appears difficult to set up in our 
constitutional order, which next to religious liberty permits also the Concordant regime. In the same 
way, the concept of the active symbol distinct from that of the passive symbol referenced in some 
judgments of the United States of America does not appear usable, also because the distinction appears 
based more on the attitude of the observer, determinable only with difficulty, than on the nature of the 
symbol itself. 
Finally, it is impossible to import into our system the concept of French laïcitè, strictly bound to 
the specific history of that Country and based not just on the neutrality of the State, but upon its 
precise choice of values.  
7.7. It serves only to add, for completion, that this being a matter of applying a principle of liberty, 
the criterion of the opinion of the majority or of a minority or of an individual cannot be permitted (the 
sole exception in Europe concerns the Austrian law of 1949, confirmed by the Concordat of 1962, that 
permits display of the cross in schools according to the will of the majority of the students). In this 
question what one observes is the eventually observable harm [vulnus] to the legal sphere even by a 
single subject; in truth, the same Corte Costituzionale, changing one of its precedents [orientamento] 
that relied on the common feeling of the majority, held that in such matters the number of adherents 
large or small to this or that religious confession does not possess any relevance (judgments already 
cited nn. 925 of 1988, 440 of 1995, 329 of 1997 and 508 of 2000). 
*** 
8.1. That admitted, it is observed first of all how the crucifix constitutes also an historical-cultural 
symbol, and consequently is endowed with an identity-value in reference to our people; even without 
quoting the well noted and authoritative assertion according to which “we cannot not call ourselves 
Christians,”276 the crucifix undoubtedly represents in this way the historical path and cultural 
characteristic of our Country and in general of all of Europe, and constitutes an effective synthesis of 
them. Only with difficulty can one deny that our tortured history is saturated—for good or ill—with 
Christianity. Neither transforming historical analyses, nor the same indisputable laicità of the State 
can modify the past. Even if we are called to live together with our tradition in a manner certainly not 
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passive, but dialectical, by considering it always open and in evolution, the past certainly cannot be 
eliminated with an act of sovereign will or through a judgment. 
8.2. For completion we add that the cited law n. 121 of 1985, a source of law famously reinforced 
as compared to ordinary law, containing the “ratification and execution of the Accord with additional 
protocols signed at Rome on February 18, 1984, that effected modifications to the Lateran Concordant 
of 11 February 1929, between the Republic of Italy and the Holy See,” as well as article 9 of that same 
Accord, expressly recognize that Christian principles “are part of the historical heritage of the Italian 
people,” with an affirmation of general application content and not solely applicable in the context of 
the teaching of the Catholic religion in the schools. 
8.3. In truth, if we wanted and were able to consider the crucifix solely as a cultural-historic 
symbol, it would be easy to resolve the legal question that occupies us by arriving at a rejection of the 
complaint, insofar as everything points to a sign that in some way encapsulates relevant aspects of our 
civilization, of our humanistic culture as well as our popular conscience, not damaging in any way the 
laicità of the State and the educational goal of the public school. 
*** 
One cannot hide here—both because of the plural meaning that this symbol contains, and because of 
an elementary respect for the truth—that the crucifix, today, cannot be considered a mere historical 
and cultural symbol, not even in the school context, but it must be evaluated also as a religious 
symbol. 
However, just as it would be reductive and simplistic—also to a certain extent—to consider the 
cross as a mere historical and cultural sign, it would also be reductive to automatically and uncritically 
correlate the qualification of that symbol as religious with the prohibition on displaying it in a public 
school, at least without first developing its particular bearing on the legally and constitutionally 
guaranteed concept of laicità that it is intended to preserve and defend. 
9.2 In this respect it should be highlighted how the cross has to be understood as a symbol of 
Christianity, not just simply one of Catholicism, and thus also collects in itself, beyond Catholicism 
itself, the values of the other Christian faiths present in our Country, from the Waldenses [Valdesi] to 
those originating in the Reformation, from the Orthodox to those of more recent migration. The 
reference to religious confessions different from Catholicism, at this time the majority confession of 
our Country, is not casual, insofar as within some of these, especially the Waldensian confession, 
affirmation of the concept of the laicità of the State anticipated by decades the republican 
Constitution. 
9.3. In substance, the cross is a symbol in which can be identified numerous (even if probably not 
all) religious confessions that take inspiration from the figure of Christ and that, in a certain way, 
thereby also constitute the sign of their common denominator; consequently, one can and must reject 
that the crucifix has to be understood according to the peculiarities of only a single one of the various 
Christian confessions, even that of Catholicism. 
*** 
10.1. The cross thus represents the distinctive sign of the Christian confessions: Now, given that it 
would be naïve and inexact to consider all religions equal or similar in their essential core, or even 
simply indifferent with respect to the secular State (it is enough to consider the problematic relations 
among several States and the Islamic religion, whose representatives often contest precisely the 
secularism [laicità] of the State), it is necessary to examine how Christianity is placed with respect to 
certain legal values protected by the republican Constitution, to evaluate the compatibility of 
positioning a Christian symbol in a public school. 
*** 
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11.1. At this point, even being aware of setting ourselves on a treacherous and impassable path, one 
cannot do less than relate how Christianity and also its elder brother, Judaism—at least from Moses on 
and surely in Talmudic interpretation—placed tolerance of the other and defense of human dignity at 
the center of their faith. 
In particular, then, Christianity—also by reference to the noted and oft-misunderstood, “Render 
unto Cesar that which is Cesar’s, and to . . .”—with its strong accent on the precept of love for one’s 
neighbor and even more the explicit prevalence give to the charity in the same faith, contains in a 
nutshell those ideas of tolerance, equality and liberty that are at the base of the modern secular State 
and that of Italy in particular. 
11.2. Turning now beyond the surface, one discerns a line of thought that connects the Christian 
revolution of two thousand years ago, the affirmation in Europe of “habeas corpus,” the same cardinal 
elements of Enlightenment (even if historically it is posed in lively contrast to religion), that is, the 
liberty and human dignity of each person, the Declaration of Human Rights, and finally, the same 
secularism [laicità] of the modern State; all of these historical phenomena are in a significant way 
founded—even if certainly not in an exclusive way—on the Christian conception of the world. It has 
been perceptively observed that the well-known phrase, “liberté, egalité, fraternité” constitutes a 
motte easily adopted by a Christian, although with obvious emphasis on the third term. 
In substance, it does not appear rash to affirm that, throught the tortured and broken path of 
European history, the secularism [laicità] of the modern Stato has hardly been obtained except (and 
certainly no only) by more or less conscious reference to the founding values of Christianity; this 
explains why many judges of Christian faith in both Europe and Italy have been among the foremost 
proponents of the secularism [laicità] of the State. 
11.3. In truth, in drafting of the republican Constitution and in fixing the principle of the laicità of 
the State, the cultural element of Christian inspiration has played a decisive part, as the work of the 
Costituente
277
 demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt. In the sweep of history, right and proper 
credit must be given to a learned Servite monk,
278
 working centuries earlier in the Republic of Venice 
who, anticipating our times, delineated in a difficult era the principles of reciprocal liberty in the two 
spheres of government and religion, and thus contextually proclaimed the secularism [laicità] of the 
State and the autonomy of religion. 
It is thus agreed that the secular juxtaposition of State and Church, now finally obtained, contains a 
principle common and beneficial to both, the secularism [laicità] of the State, an expression in a 
parcular sector of the precept of tollerance contained in the kerygma of the Christian faith. 
Libera Chiesa in libero Stato
279
 has today become alegally shared and protected value, even if the 
difficult path walked to establish it among the range of legal norms was different in the varying 
nations of Europe. As specifically regards Italy, the affirmation of the indpendence and sovreignty of 
the State and the churches, each in its proper order, was established for the Catholic Church in article 7 
of the Constitution (reproduced, in a passage quite similar, by the conciliare constitution Gaudium et 
spes, at n. 76), and for other confessions by the succeeding article 8. 
11.5. The bond between Chrstianity and liberty implicates an historical consequence that is not 
immediately perceptibole, like an underground river only recently explored precisely because it is 
underground for most of its course, also because in the tormented affair of States and churches in 
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Europe the numerous attempts of churches to interfere in questions of state and vice versa are easily 
recognized, so that rather frequently well-known Christian ideals have been abbandoned because of 
reasons of power and in the end violent opposition between governments and religious authorities. 
11.6. However, considered in perspective, the central core and constant of Christian faith, 
notwithstanding the Inquisition, anti-Semitism, and the Crusades, one can easily discern the 
principle of human dignity, of tolerance, of evern religious liberty and thus in the final 
analysis the foundation of the same laicità of the State. 
11.7. Knowing how to focus on history, as if on a mountain rather than confined to the valley, one 
discerns a perceptible affinity (not identity) between the “essential core” of Christianity which, 
privileging charity over every other aspect, including faith, places the accent on acceptance of the 
other, and the “essential core” of the republican Constitution, which consists in the legal endorsement, 
through solidarity, of the liberty of everyone and thus in the legal guarantee of respect for the other. 
The synthesis endures even though surrounding these two cores, both focused on human dignity, there 
are at times highly encrusted sedimentations, so much so as often to hide them—this holds expecially 
for Christianity. 
11.8. In truth, if we may be permitted the expression, the consonance between the two harmonious 
spheres does not concern secondary aspects at all, but the respective fulcra of each of the Christian 
religion and the State. For Christianity, in fact, the method—that is, charity—prevails over premises—
that is, faith—and over goals—that is, hope--, which constitute a constant among religions. At the 
same time, in mature democracies, the democratic method prevails over goals, by definition ever-
changing, and over premises, by now part of the heritage of those belonging to the social contract. 
11.9. One can therefore argue that, in actual social reality, the crucifix must be considered not just 
as a symbol of historical-cultural evolution, and thus of the identity of our people, but as the symbol 
moreover of a system of values of liberty, equality, human dignity, and religious tolerance, and thus 
also of the laicità of the State, principles that give life to our constitutional Charter. 
In other words, the constitutional principles of liberty have many roots, and one of these is 
undoubtedly Christianity, in its very essence. It would be, therefore, subtly paradoxical to exclude a 
Christian sign from a public structure in the name of a laicità that surely has that precisel Christian 
religion as one of its distant sources. 
*** 
12.1 This Court certainly does not ignore how in the past other values have been attributed to the 
symbol of the crucifix, such as, at the time of the Statuto Albertino, the crucifix as the sign of 
Catholicism understood as the religion of the State, utilized, therefore, to Christianize a power and 
consolidate an authority. 
We are also aware that even today the symbol of the cross can yield diverse interpretations: First of 
all, a strictly religious one, whether referring to Christianity in general or to Catholism in particular. 
We are also aware that some students attending public school could freely and legitimately attribute to 
the cross meanings still more diverse, such as the crucifix as as sign of unacceptable preference given 
to one religion over the others, or of a blow [vulnus] to individual liberty and thus precisely to the 
laicità of the State, or of a reference to the limit of cesaropapism or of the Inquisition, even as a 
gratuitous remnant of the catechism implicitly supplied to nonbelievers in a location not suitable for 
subliminal propaganda in favor of Christian confessions: these are all matters of quite respectable 
opinion, but at bottom not relevant to the case under examination. 
12.2. In fact, in evaluating the question without falling into subjectivism, which in constast to 
individual liberty is not legally or constitutionally guaranteed, (and thus not permitting that a 
solipsistic intepretation come to be—to use a customary expression in administrative law—
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“otherwise” protected, one must necessarily be aware also of the reality in which we work, of the light 
of the actual constitutional order and of living law. 
In other words, it is needful to refer oneself to the well-known facts underlying the case which, in 
the particular case under examination, also concern some indisputable social aspects, one of which 
relates, first of all, to the minority position assumed in our secularized society by citizens who adhere 
to various religious faiths in a nonsuperficial or skin-deep manner (and especially by Christians), 
which renders plausible and easy the reading of a symbol like the cross, displayed in a school context, 
as a cultural and also a religious sign, but interpreted in the limited and unrestrictive sense indicated 
above. 
In truth, recent sociological analyses at the European and Italian level show an evident 
disassociation between the practice of faith, by now a minority activity, and adherence to the 
secularized values of Christianity, which appear instead as a widely diffused legacy. One academic, 
endowed with an ironic sense of paradox and spirit of observation, has defined the Europe of today as 
a continuing pagan flight from religious superstitutions. 
12.3. Correlatively, by virtue of the same laicità of the State, one must reiterate the necessity of 
public instruction, including the so-called civic education, which references no just history but also 
democratic and secular values of the enforceable and living constitution. The d.PR. n. 104 of 1985, 
containing scholastic programs, expressly reproduces the entire article 3 of the Constitution and 
immediately adds the following concerning religion: The state school does not have its own creed to 
preach nor an agnosticism to privilege. It recognizes the valure of religious reality as an historical 
given, culturally and morally personified in the social reality of which the child has experience and, as 
such, the school makes the value of this reality an object of attention in the entirety of its educational 
activity, having reguard for the religious experience that the child lives in his or her own family 
environment and in such a way as to mature feelings and behaviors of respect of the diverse positions 
in matters of religion and to oppose every form of discrimination. 
12.4. In substance, in the actual moment, the crucifix in class presents a formative meaning and can 
and must be understood, both as the symbol of our history and culture and consequently of our very 
identity, and as a symbol of the principles of liberty, equality, and tolerance, and finally of the very 
laicità of the State, foundations of our life together and by now assimilated to the legal, social, and 
cultural legacy of Italy. 
12.5. The sign of the cross, therefore, is to be considered—in its display in schools—also as a 
religious symbol of Christianity, certainly not understood its totality and thus with all of its 
implications and superstructures, but in the measure in which its founding meanings of acceptance and 
respect for one’s neighbor—that constitute as seen the foundation and keystone of Christianity—have 
been transfused into the principles of the laicità of the State, thus visibly protecting from an 
educational perspective the sharing of certain fundamental principles of the Republic with the heritage 
of Christianity. 
12.6. It should also be clearly stressed that the symbol of the crucifix, so understood, assumes 
today, with the reference to values of tolerance, a particular meaning in the consideration that the 
Italian public school is actually attended by numerous foreign students, to whom it is quite important 
to transmit those principles of openess to diversity and rejection of all fundamentalisms—be they 
religious or secular—that pervade our legal order. We live in a tumultuous moment of encounter with 
other cultures and, to avoid its transformation into violent confrontation, it is indispensable to reaffirm 
symbolically our identity, all the more so since that identity is itself characterized by values of respect 
for the dignity of each human being and of universal solidarity. 
*** 
13.1. For mere scruple of completeness, it must be added che examination of the symbol of the cross 
of the cross effected on the basis of the well known and accepted theory of semiotic science, according 
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to which it is indispensable to examine the elements that a sign excludes rather than those it includes 
in order to discern the signficance of the naturally polyvalent symbol, leads to the same result as that 
outlined above. 
13.2. To be sure, religious symbols in general implicate a logical mechanism of exclusion; infact, 
the opint of departure for each religious faith is precisely the belief in a superior being by which 
adherents or the faithful find themselves by definition and conviction in the right. Consequently and 
inevitably, the attitude of one who believes with respect to one who doesn’t, who thus is implicitly 
opposed to the supreme being, is one of exclusion. 
The distinction towards the infidel is not expressed by proper name or group, but even in the name 
of name of the omnipotent, who constitutes an exceptional coolective spiritual force for believers, but 
also a formidable danger, because it expresses the profound root of every religious fundamentalism. In 
determined historical circumstances, therefore, it becomes possible to instrumentalize religion, to the 
point of violence and war conducted in the name of the creator, as was tuaght to us by the paradoxical 
motto of the Nazi police, “Gott mit uns,” and the same tragic chronicle of the years at the beginning of 
this century. 
13.3. The logical mechanism of exclusion of the infidel is inserted in every religious creed, even if 
its followers are not aware of it—with the sole exception, however, of Christianity, alaready well 
understood (which obviously had not always happened in the past nor happens today, not even in the 
works of those proclaiming themselves Christians), which considers this same faith in the omnipotent 
secondary before charity, that is, with resepect to one’s neighbor. It follows from this that rejection of 
the nonbeliever on the parte of a Christian implcates the radical negation of this very Christianity, 
substantial and gratuitous denunciation, which doesn’t apply to other religius faiths, for which it can 
constitute at the most the violation of an important precept. 
13.4. The symbol of Christinaity—the cross—cannot, therefore, exclude anyone without negating 
itself; to the contrary, it constitutes, in a certain sense, the universal signof acceptance and of respect 
for every human being as such, independently of any of his or her beliefs, religious or not. 
*** 
14.1. It serves only to add that the cross in class, properly understood, does not depend on the free 
convictions of anyone, does not exclude anyone and obviouisly does not impose or prescribe anthing 
on or to anyone, but solely implicates, in the context of educational goals and the arrangements of the 
public school, a reflection—necessarily guided by the teachers—on Italian history and on the shared 
values of our society as legally reflected in the Constitution, among which in primary place is the 
laicità of the State. 
14.2. To hazard a comparison, no one can dispute the symbolic sense, inclusive and assertive—
mutatis mutandis—of the verse of the Koran singing the praises of the divine mercy prominently 
displayed on the campus of the Unviersity of Tunis—attended also by Christians, Jews, the religious 
indifferent, and atheists—or of the Muslim crescent that stands out on the flag of even secular Turkey. 
*** 
15.1 Remaining within the ambit of the analogy just cited, the sign of the cross that stands out on the 
flags of some European Countries, such as Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland, has its historical 
origins also in Christianity (principally in the Lutheran confession and, in case of Finland, also in 
Christian Orthodoxy), but it has lost through time every connotation referencing the strict bond that at 
one time existed between those States and religius faith, to assume the meaning of a symbol of nations 
that have become profoundly secular, without at all disavowing their Christian history, but on the 
contrary preserving in it certain universal values. 
15.2. In other words, a Finnish citizen of Baha’I faither or an atheist or a person simply religiously 
indifferent, certainly cannot feel offended in his or her sphere of liberty by the presence in public 
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schools of the national symbol of the Country, even if it contains a cross. In the same way, in the 
actual cultural context of Europe, a Greek, Maltese, Swiss, English, or Slovak citizen can easily and 
reasonably distinguish in the cross that stands out on the flag, beyond a reference to his or her own 
history and identity, also a reference to the values of secular democracy. 
Returning to Italy, this is not about maintaining coats of arms or banners of local entities that 
explicitly reference Christian symbology, such as the official flag of the Veneto Region, posted in 
numerous public offices in its territory with apparently disburbing anyone. 
The crucifix cosntitutes surely a different symbol than a flag, and besides, in Italy the cultural 
evolution did not otherwise reach the same level as the Nordic Countries or—more correctly and for 
evident historical reasons—it lacks the full awareness of it, but in any event the laicità of the State and 
the principal constitutional provisions of liberty appear universally accepted in such a manner as to 
permit a new and updated consideration of the symbol of the cross. 
*** 
16.1. Summarizing and concluding, the crucifix understood as the symbol of a particular history, 
culture and national identity—an element immediately perceptible—in addition to the expression of 
certain secular principles of the community—which requires instead a reasonable interpretive effort—
can be legitimately displayed in the classrooms of the public school, in so far as it does not contrast 
with but indeed affirms and confirms the principle of the laicità of the republican State. 
16.2. For all the reasons indicated above the complaint is dismissed, even if the partial novelty of 
the question and the shared values of liberty invoked by the plaintiff induce the Court to divide the 
expenses of judgment among the parties. 
P.Q.M.280 
The Tribunale Amministrative Regionale for Veneto, third panel, rejects every contrary point and 
exception, definitively prounouncing on the complaint premessa, exempting from the judgment the 
Associazione Forum but not the A.GE. (Italian Parents Association) of Padova,  
dismissed. 
 Expenses compensated. 
 It is ordered that the present judgment be followed by the administrative Authority. 
 So decided in Venice, in the Camera di Consiglio, this day 17 March 2005. 
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II. Appendix II: Decision No. 7314, Reg. Ric. No. 556/06 (Consiglio di Stato Feb. 13, 
2006)* 
REPUBLIC OF ITALY 
IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE 
 
The Consiglio di Stato in its reviewing capacity [sede giurisdizionale] (Sixth Panel) has 
pronounced the following 
DECISION 
. . . 
[The Consiglio di Stato first stated and summarized the parties, facts, and issues on appeal, and then 
ruled on the procedural and jurisdictional objections raised below. The Consiglio affirmed the 
holdings of the Tribunale Amministrativo Regional – Veneto,281 the court below, that the notice given 
to the other parties of Ms. Lautsi’s complaint was adequate, that the administrative law judge had 
competent jurisdiction, and that Ms. Lautsi adequately identified the regulations that she is 
challenging. It reversed, however, the Tribunale’s holding that the Associazione Forum, Mr. Bonato, 
and the Italian Parents Association of Padova (A.Ge.) could not intervene in the case, concluding 
instead that each was a proper opposing interested party that had properly intervened. The Consiglio 
then took up the merits of Ms. Lautsi’s appeal.] 
. . .  
LAW 
1.- The judgment deals with the legitimacy of the deliberation of the Consiglio di Istituto
282
 of the 
state middle school “Vittorino da Feltre” of Abano Terme, during which the request of the plaintiff to 
remove the crucifix from public school classrooms was rejected. The TAR Veneto, with the previously 
indicated order, rejected the complaint, declaring it without merit . . . . 
. . . 
3.- Passing to the merits, the complaint is without merit. 
The appellant first of all reiterates the importance, disregarded by the TAR,
283
 of the implicit 
abrogation of the norm of article 118, r.d. 1924 no. 965 (it being unnecessary to speak of article 119 of 
r.d.no. 1297/1928 insofar as it refers to elementary schools while the minor children attend middle 
school), its not having been “reproduced” by the Testo Unico284 of 1994 which codified the entire 
subject matter and otherwise abandoned at least the principle of confessionalism, set forth by article 1 
of the Statuto Albertino
285
 that represents its foundation, in that this statutory norm was not 
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 The “Administrative Tribunal for the Veneto Region.” 
282
 The governing council of the middle school where the plaintiff’s children attended, consisting of parent, teacher, and 
employee representatives and constituted by law. 
283
 The conventional abbreviation for Tribuanle Amministrativo Regionale. 
284
 The Testo Unico—literally, the “Unified Text”—is the compilation by the Italian government of the various laws enacted 
by the Chamber of Deputies, roughly analogous to the United States Code, and sometimes abbreviated, “T.U.” 
285
 The Statuto Albertino was adopted as the constitution of the Kingdom of Savoy under King Albert in 1849, and later as 
the Constitution of the unified Kingdom of Italy in 1861. Among other things, it provided that the “Catholic, Apostolic, 
Roman Church” shall be the “sole religion of the State.” 
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incorporated by the law no. 121/1985 putting into effect the Accord of Villa Madama, in contrast to 
what happened with the law 801 of 1929 putting into effect the Lateran Treaty. 
As far as the first consideration of the appellant with reference to what has been established by the 
Corte Costituzionale on the controlling character of the norm of article 118 r.d. 1924 no. 965, that, as 
such, it cannot be considered to have been codified by the Testo Unico 1994 (notwithstanding that if 
such were the case the Corte would not have been able to abstain from adjudicating its legitimacy), 
nor can it be held to have been abrogated (and the same Corte in its order did not ever place in 
discussion its enforceability). 
In relation to the second consideration, it does not appear correct to place the principle of the 
confessionalism of the State as the foundation of the regulation in question (so that the elimination of 
one would be also the elimination of the reason for being of the other). It is well understood, in fact, 
that in 1924 when the norm was promulgated as enforceable in Italy, the Statuto Albertino whose 
article 1 proclaimed the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion as “the only religion of the State” 
(the other religions being tolerated to the extent they conformed to the law); but it is otherwise true 
that such norm did not minimally hinder the Legislature, in the course of the decades, from adopting in 
multiple sectors of the life of the State a norm contrary to the interests of the Catholic confession, nor, 
in the opinion of some authors, even those well qualified, from including the Catholic church among 
unlawful associations. 
The problem of the enforceability of article 118 r.d. 1924 no. 965 cannot, however, be adequately 
resolved by the lack of mention in the Villa Madama Accords of a principle (that of the 
confessionalism of the state), required in the Lateran Treaty of 1929 (that is to say, five years after the 
promulgation of the norm itself), but is dealt with by means of the verification of the compatibility of 
however so much of it is consistent with the principles today inspired by the constitutional order of the 
State, and in particular with the principle of laicità, invoked by the appellant herself. In that regard, the 
Corte Costituzionale has many times recognized in laicità a supreme principle of our constitutional 
order, sufficient to resolve any questions of constitutional legitimacy (for example, among many 
pronouncements, those regarding norms on mandatory attendance at religious [Catholic] teaching in 
the public schools, or on the jurisdictional competence for cases concerning the validity of marriage 
entered into under canon law and transcribed in the registers of the civil state). It has to do with a 
principle not proclaimed explicitly by our fundamental Charter; a principle that is rich with ideological 
resonance and a controversial history, that assumes, however, legal relevance by being derivable from 
the fundamental norms of our order. In reality, the Corte derives it specifically from articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 
19, and 20 of the Constitution.  
The principle utilizes a linguistic symbol (“laicità”) that indicates in abbreviated form meaningful 
profiles of what is vested in the aforementioned norms, whose contents identify the conditions of use 
according to which lacità is understood and used. On the other hand, without the identification of such 
specific conditions of use, the principle of “laicità” would remain confined to ideological disputes and 
would be used only with difficulty in juridical situations. 
In this situation the conditions of use are certainly determined by reference to the cultural tradition, 
to the living customs, of each people, insofar, however, as such tradition and such customs are poured 
into the juridical order. And this varies from nation to nation. So there is no doubt that in one way the 
principle of the English order is understood and used as secular, although strictly connected to the 
Anglican church, which is permitted to issue secular legislative norms relating to internal affairs of the 
church itself (a relatively recent example is given by the law on ordination of women as priests); in 
another way in the French order, for which laïcitè, constitutionally enacted (article 2 Constitution of 
1958), represents an end that the state can pursue, and in fact has pursued, even to the extent of 
disrespecting the organizational autonomy of denominations (lois Combis) and the individual freedom 
of expression of one’s religious faith (laws on the wearing of religious symbols); and in yet another 
way the federal order of the United States of America, in which the indeed rigorous separation 
Cross, crucifix, culture: an approach to the constitutional meaning of confessional symbols 
53 
between the State and religious denominations, imposed by the First Amendment to the federal 
Constitution, does not prevent a diffuse piety in civil society inspired by the religious traditions of the 
pilgrim Fathers that can be seen in multiple forms, even institutionally, by an explicit attestation of 
religious faith inscribed on religious coins and money (in God we trust), to the large provision of tax 
exemptions granted to economic donations given to confessional organizations and their welfare, 
social, and educational activities, in the horizon of privatized liberalism typical of American society); 
in another way, finally, in the Italian order, in which that linguistic symbol serves to indicate 
reciprocal autonomy between the temporal and spiritual orders, and consequently prohibits the State 
from entering into the internal affairs of religious denominations (arts. 7 and 8 of the Constitution); 
protected by fundamental personal rights (art. 2), independent of what is provided by the religion to 
which one belongs; equal legal protection among all citizens, it being irrelevant for such purpose their 
unusual religious faith (art. 3); respect of the liberty of denominations to organize themselves 
autonomously according to their own rules, so long as these do not violate the Italian juridical order 
(art 8, 2
nd
 [co.]), and for all, and not just for citizens, protection of the liberty in religious matters—that 
is, to believe or not to believe, to manifest in public or private their faith, to exercise its rites of 
worship (art. 19); the prohibition, finally, of discriminating against denominational entities on the 
basis of their religion and with the purpose of discriminating against religion or sect (art.20). From the 
Italian constitutional norms recalled by the Corte for delinating the laicità proper to the State can be 
deduced, additionally, a favorable attitude in interactions with religious phenomena and with the faiths 
it propounds, the Constitution having set relevant limits to the free explication of the legislative 
activity of the state in the matter of relations with religious confessions; an activity that is able to be 
practiced ordinarily only in agreement with the both the religion of the majority as well as the other 
religious confessions (art. 7, 2
nd
 [co.], and art. 8, 3
rd
 [co.]). 
From this it is inferred that lacità, although it presupposes and requires everywhere the distinction 
between the temporal dimension and the spiritual dimension and between the orders and the societies 
to which such dimensions properly belong [sono proprie], is not realized in terms consistent in time 
and uniform in different countries, but indeed within a self-same civilization. It is relative to the 
specific institutional organization of each State, and therefore essentially historical, bound as it is to 
the development of this organization (for example, laicità in Italy must be understood with reference 
to the Stato risogimentale,
286
 where, notwithstanding the principle of the confessionalism of the State, 
proclaimed by the fundamental Statuto [Albertino] of the Kingdom, restricting discriminations were 
permitted on ecclesiastical [i.e., Catholic] entities,
287
 and with reference to the contemporary State, 
risen from the republican Constitution and by now no longer confessional, in which those 
discriminations could not take place. 
Which, then, of the legal systems recalled here, or of still others not considered here, is to be the 
best answer to the abstract idea of laicità—which in the end will coincide with that which each finds 
most consonant with his or her ideological assumptions—is an old question; a question that, however, 
is left to doctrinal disputes. 
In this jurisdictional seat, for the problem raised before us of the legitimacy of displaying the 
crucifix in public school classrooms, decided by competent authorities in execution of the regulations, 
is a matter of concretely and more simply verifying if such display is in violation of the substance of 
the fundamental norms of our constitutional order, that gives form and substance to the principle of 
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 The Risorgimento refers to the period, beginning in the 17th century, during which a consciousness and desire for national 
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“laicità” that today characterizes the Italian State, and to which the supreme judge of the laws288 has 
many times made reference. 
It is evident that the crucifix is itself a symbol that can assume diverse meanings and serve diverse 
purposes; first of all, because of the location where it is displayed. 
In a place of worship the crucifix is properly and exclusively a “religious symbol,” insofar as it 
seeks to encourage a reverent adherence [adesione] towards the founder of the Christian religion. 
In a nonreligious place, such as the school, dedicated to the education of youth, the crucifix will 
still be able to perform for believers it announcement of religious values, but for believers and 
unbelievers its display will be justified and will assume a nondiscriminatory meaning under its 
religious contours, if it is able to represent and to bring to mind relevant civil values in an immediately 
perceptible and intuitive synthetic form (as is the case with every symbol), and particularly those 
values that suggest and inspire our constitutional order, the foundation of shared civic life. In this 
sense, the crucifix will be able to develop, even in a “secular” sense [orizzonte] different from the 
religious sense that is natural to it [che gli è proprio], a highly educational symbolic function, 
irrespective of the religion professed by the students. 
Now it is evident that in Italy, the crucifix can express, precisely from a symbolic point of view but 
also in an adequate way, the religious origin of the values of tolerance, of reciprocal respect, of the 
value of the person, of his or her rights, of concern for his or her liberty, of the autonomy of individual 
moral conscience with respect to government authority, of human solidarity, of denial of every 
discrimination, that connote Italian civilization. 
These values, which are themselves saturated with traditions, a way of life, the culture of the Italian 
people, suggest and emerge from the fundamental norms of our constitutional Charter, found among 
the “fundamental principles” and Part I of the Constitution and, specifically, from those called to mind 
by the Corte Costituzionale, delineating the lacità proper to the Italian State. 
The reference, by means of the crucifix, to the religious orgins of these values and of their full and 
radical consonance with Christian teachings, serve therefore to place in evidence their transcendent 
foundation, without placing in question, indeed by reiterating, the autonomy (not the counterposition, 
leading to an ideological interpretation of laicità that is not found in the text of our fundamental 
Charter) of the temporal order with respect to the the spiritual order, and without diminishing their 
specific “laicità,” consistent with the cultural context properly made and manifested by the 
fundamental legal order of the Italian State. These values, however, will have to be lived in civil 
society in an autonomous way (in reality, not contradictory) with respect to religious society, so that 
they can be “secularly” ratified by all, independent of membership in the religion that has inspired and 
preached them. 
As with every symbol, diverse and constrasting meanings also can be imposed upon or attributed to 
the crucifix, or one can deny its symbolic value in order to transform it into a decoration that can at the 
most exhibit artistic value. One cannot, however, think of the crucifix exhibited in school classrooms 
as a decoration, an object of décor, nor even as an object of worship; one must rather think of it as a 
symbol suitable for expressing the elevated foundation of the civic values referenced above, which are 
them the values that delineate laicità in the actual legal order of the State. 
In the Italian cultural context, it appears difficult to find another symbol, in truth, that lends itself to 
doing this better than the crucifix; and the appellant moreover desires (and claims a right to) a blank 
wall [parete bianco], as the only kind that would appear to be particularly consonant with the value of 
the lacità of the State. 
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The decision of the educational authorities, in enforcing the regulation, to exhibit the crucifix in 
school classrooms, does not appear blameworthy in reference to the principle of laicità appropriate to 
the Italian State. 
The pretext that the State abstains from presenting or preaching in a place of education, by means 
of a symbol (the crucifix) considered suitable to the purpose, undoubtedly secular values (even if of 
religious origin), which pervade Italian society and that connote its fundamental Charter, can (if ever) 
be argued in jurisdictions (political, cultural) judged more appropriate, but not in the judicial arena. 
In this jurisdiction, therefore, one cannot accept the request of the appellant that the State and its 
organs abstain from relying upon the educational instrument considered most effective for expressing 
the values on which the State itself is founded and that characterize it, set forth and expressed in the 
constitutional Charter, when recourse to such instruments does not only not undermine any of the 
principles established by that same Constitution or other norms of its legal order, but aims to affirm 
them in a way that underscores their high significance. 
In conclusion, the principal appeal is rejected, the incidental appeals of the Associazioni Forum and 
A.GE. are affirmed to the extent to which they claim the right of intervention in the case. 
The expenses and attorneys fees can be awarded. 
P.Q.M.289 
The Consiglio di Stato . . . orders that the present decision be followed by the administrative 
Authority. 
So decided in Rome, 13 January 2006, by the Consiglio di Stato in its reviewing capacity [sede 
giurisdizionale] (Sixth Panel) in the Camera di Consiglio . . . . 
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